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BEYOND THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL:
EQUALITY DIRECTIVES IN AMERICAN LAW
OLATUNDE C.A. JOHNSON*
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, VOL. 87, 2012
American civil rights regulation is generally understood as relying on private
enforcement in courts, rather than imposing positive duties on state actors to further
equity goals. This Article argues that this dominant conception of American civil rights
regulation is incomplete. Rather, American civil rights regulation also contains a set of
“equality directives,” whose emergence and reach in recent years have gone
unrecognized in the commentary. These federal-level equality directives use
administrative tools of conditioned spending, policymaking, and oversight powerfully to
promote substantive inclusion with regard to race, ethnicity, language, and disability.
These directives move beyond the constraints of the standard private attorney general
regime of antidiscrimination law. They engage broader tools of state power, just as
recent Supreme Court decisions have constrained private enforcement. They require
states to take proactive, front-end, affirmative measures, rather than relying on
backward-looking, individually driven complaints. And these directives move beyond a
narrow focus on individual bias to address current, structural barriers to equality. As a
result, these directives are profoundly transforming the operation and design of
programs at the state and local levels. They are engaging both traditional civil rights
groups and community-based groups in innovative and promising new forms of
advocacy and implementation.
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INTRODUCTION

States and localities receiving federal transportation funds must
include minority groups in their planning, assess the racial impacts of their
programs, and adopt nondiscriminatory alternatives.1 State and local

1

See 49 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2011) (imposing requirements of nondiscrimination and proactive
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governments that receive federal housing funds must promote integration
on the basis of race, ethnicity, and disability in their programs by analyzing
barriers to fair housing and removing those barriers.2 Federal agencies
administering programs related to food, nutrition, forestry, and agriculture
must conduct a “civil rights impact analysis” to ensure that minorities and
people with disabilities fairly benefit from federally funded programs.3
Such agencies must also take steps to mitigate any adverse impacts on
these groups.4 Federal agencies must take affirmative steps to provide
persons with limited English proficiency (LEP) “meaningful access” to
federally funded programs.5
These statutes and regulations do not fit into the classic conception of
modern American civil rights law. Commentators have come to understand

inclusion on federal grantees); FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CIRCULAR FTA C
4702.1A, TITLE VI AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT
ADMINISTRATION RECIPIENTS II-1 (2007) [hereinafter FTA C 4702.1A], available at
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Title_VI_Circular_4702.1A.pdf (listing the following among
the objectives of the regulation: (1) ensuring access to transportation by all groups, (2) preventing
racial, ethnic, and class disparities in the environmental effects of transportation, (3) promoting
full and fair participation in transportation decisionmaking by all affected populations, and (4)
ensuring access to programs and activities by persons with limited English proficiency). These
provisions, which apply to the Federal Department of Transportation (DOT) and its state and
local grantees, implement Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006)
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally funded
programs).
2 See 24 C.F.R. § 570.487(b) (2012) (requiring, inter alia, that local governments receiving
community development block grants certify that they will “affirmatively further fair housing,”
(AFFH) conduct an analysis of “impediments to fair housing choice within the State,” and take
“appropriate actions to overcome the effects of any impediments identified through that
analysis”); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.225(a), .325(a), .425(a) (2012) (imposing a duty on recipients
of certain community planning and development grants to “affirmatively further fair housing,”
including requiring analysis of “impediments to fair housing choice”). Additional guidance from
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) requires that jurisdictions participate
with citizens to develop their plans to further fair housing, detail fair housing goals, and report on
steps undertaken to meet those goals. See 1 OFFICE OF FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, U.S.
DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, at 2-5 to -7 (1996)
[hereinafter
FAIR
HOUSING
PLANNING
GUIDE],
available
at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/images/fhpg.pdf (providing an overview of fair housing
planning requirements for state and local grantees). These directives implement section 3608 of
the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which requires HUD to administer programs “in a manner
affirmatively to further the policies of [the Fair Housing Act].” 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006);
see also § 3608(d) (requiring the same of all federal departments and agencies).
3 See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., DR 4300-4, CIVIL RIGHTS IMPACT
ANALYSIS 1 (2003), available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/directives/doc/DR4300-4.pdf
(summarizing the purpose and requirements of a civil rights impact analysis).
4 See id.
5 Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 16, 2000); DOJ Policy Guidance,
Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—National Origin Discrimination
Against Persons with Limited English Proficiency, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,123 (Aug. 16, 2000).

American civil rights statutes as achieving their public ends
(nondiscrimination, equity, and integration) by delegating private parties to
serve as enforcers through individual litigation.6 Political development
scholars highlight American civil rights law’s emphasis on private
enforcement, contrasting it with European models of civil rights regulation
that place greater reliance on the state’s administrative apparatus to
advance equity.7 Unlike Europe or the United Kingdom, they claim, the
American state does not impose positive duties on state actors to further
equity goals.8 For scholars of American political development, this facet of
American civil rights law is consistent with the “weak” fragmented nature
of the American state: In the formative period of civil rights regulation, the
United States consciously rejected centralized, bureaucratic forms of civil
rights governance and instead relied on a fragmented system of private
enforcement through courts.9
This dominant narrative is not inaccurate—particularly as compared to
European models of governance—but it is incomplete. This Article shows
that American civil rights regulation also operates by placing a set of

6 See, e.g., Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The EEOC and
Civil Rights Enforcement (Jan. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York
University Law Review) (documenting this view); see also SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION
STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 3–4 (2010) (describing civil
rights statutes like Title VII as entailing a “legislative choice to rely upon private litigation in
statutory implementation”).
7 See generally, e.g., Robert C. Lieberman, Weak State, Strong Policy: Paradoxes of Race
Policy in the United States, Great Britain, and France, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 138 (2002)
(contrasting American, British, and French approaches to civil rights law).
8 See Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination Law in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 405, 438 (contrasting U.K. law to U.S. law, which “imposes no such [affirmative] duty on
public authorities”); Leland Ware, A Comparative Analysis of Unconscious and Institutional
Discrimination in the United States and Britain, 36 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 140, 146–48,
150–51 (2007) (describing the positive duties imposed on public authorities under U.K. law and
contrasting these with the American emphasis on antidiscrimination and remedying harm). These
comparisons arise from examinations of the United Kingdom’s 2000 Amendments to the Race
Relations Act of 1976, which impose a “general statutory duty” on public authorities to eliminate
unlawful discrimination, promote equality of opportunity, and promote good relations between
different racial groups. Race Relations (Amendment) Act, 2000, c. 34, § 2 (Eng.); see also Suk,
supra, at 436–37 (describing the U.K. Amendments and similar European Union and Northern
Ireland laws that rely on “mainstreaming,” which “requires equality to be . . . ‘taken into account
in every policy and executive decision’” (quoting SANDRA FREDMAN, DISCRIMINATION LAW 176
(2002))).
9 See ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHAPING RACE POLICY 149 (2005) (comparing employment
discrimination policy in the United States to France and Great Britain, and finding that “[i]n the
United States, fragmented and decentralized politics produced a fragmented and individualistic
enforcement regime”). For a discussion of American reliance on adversarial rather than
bureaucratic methods of policy implementation in civil rights and other areas, describing the rise
of litigation and “private attorneys general” as responses to the fragmented American state, see
ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 15–16, 46–47 (2001).

positive duties on state actors to promote equality and inclusion. I analyze
statutes and regulations that I call equality directives. I show how these
directives’ goals and functions differ from those that emphasize individual
enforcement or redress of private claims. Beyond completing our
understanding of civil rights law, I argue that these equality directives
deserve greater attention from academic commentators and advocates
interested in promoting equity. For one, recent Supreme Court decisions
have limited private enforcement of civil rights statutes and tightened the
procedural rules for pursuing claims in federal court,10 which strains the
private attorney general model upon which civil rights advocates
historically have depended. In addition, equality directives can serve as
powerful tools for moving beyond a focus on courts and on the limited goal
of antidiscrimination dominant in traditional civil rights law. To address
inequality today, legal and regulatory interventions must address more than
bias. These interventions should engage state regulatory and programmatic
power, not just judicial power. Through the use of spending, policymaking,
and oversight, a regime of equality directives can counter the limitations of
adjudication-based civil rights regimes. States and local authorities are
already implementing these directives by taking proactive, affirmative
measures to redesign transit, housing, and other services in ways that allow
greater participation of previously excluded groups and in ways that
reshape the structural landscape that has previously sustained inequality.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I argues that the standard
conception of civil rights law ignores equality directives. The typical
account of American civil rights law identifies two enforcement regimes:
(1) a private attorney general model and (2) a public enforcement model
understood as either prosecution by public agencies in court or claim
resolution through administrative adjudication.11 Part I argues that a third
civil rights regulatory regime exists: one centered on advancing civil rights
norms through formal and informal forms of administrative power. My
prime examples are Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act12 and provisions

10 For example, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556–57 (2007), moved away from
the liberal federal pleading regime of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), and required that, to
survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs plead enough “factual matter” to state a “plausible” claim
for relief. Subsequently, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–80 (2009), applied Twombly’s
“plausibility” standard to constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
11 See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 6, at 4–5, 21–22, 34 (discussing the congressional
mobilization of private litigants to enforce Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
rejection of administrative adjudication models); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement
of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401 (1998)
(distinguishing between private enforcement by litigants in courts and government prosecution of
claims).
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (forbidding discrimination by federal grantees on the basis

of the Fair Housing Act that require federal agencies and grantees to take
affirmative steps to further fair housing goals.13 As Part I shows, these
statutes and regulations unleash a range of administrative tools, including
conditioned spending and formal and informal forms of regulatory
oversight and guidance, to promote equity and inclusion in federal-state
programs. Largely because of the institutional choice these statutes
present—a bureaucratic form of enforcement disfavored by most civil
rights commentators14—these statutes and regulations are given scant
attention in the civil rights literature and in the practice and development of
civil rights law.15 In the first Part, I introduce these statutes and related
regulatory actions that impose positive and pervasive duties on state actors
to promote equity.
Part II shows why this third model is particularly salient for promoting
equity and substantive inclusion today. Much of what commentators find
insufficient about the traditional civil rights regime—its limitations in
addressing disparate impacts,16 its fixation on formalized aspects of
discrimination and bias,17 its impotence in the face of embedded,
institutionalized forms of racial exclusion18—can be addressed through
equality directives. Equality directives do more than combat discrimination

of race, color, or national origin).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006) (requiring HUD to administer its programs and
activities “in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of [the Fair Housing Act]”); § 3608(d)
(requiring the same of all federal departments and agencies).
14 See infra notes 106–114 and accompanying text (describing skepticism among civil rights
commentators about agency capacity to enforce civil rights).
15 For instance, when Congress strengthened the severely flawed FHA in 1988, it
strengthened the administrative enforcement apparatus (through agency prosecutions and
adjudications) and the private enforcement apparatus. See infra text accompanying notes 92–96.
But Congress failed even to discuss mechanisms for strengthening what I would suggest is
another pillar of the Act—the duties it requires of federal, state, and local governments.
16 See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
734, 738–43 (2006) (discussing the practical failures and limitations of Title VII’s conception of
discrimination after conducting empirical analysis); Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1135–37 (1997) (discussing the limitations of the Constitution’s construction of discrimination).
17 See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 879–96 (2004) (proposing an emphasis on “racial stigma” to counter
limitations of current equal protection jurisprudence); Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the
Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1998, at 117, 118–19
(urging a move away from a focus on discrimination towards a focus on social capital and other
mechanisms that lead to economic disparities).
18 See Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias
Matter? Law, Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1113–14 (2009) (doubting
that racial bias “explains all or even most of the racial injustices that plague our society” and
arguing that “many decisions and practices that adversely affect racial minorities do not fit neatly
within the conventional antidiscrimination framework”).

and bias: They also seek to promote economic and other opportunities, full
participation in government-funded programs, and social inclusion for
excluded groups.
Part III examines equality directives in two areas that are particularly
central to promoting opportunity and inclusion today: housing and
transportation. These case studies show how equality directives emerged at
the federal level. Further, these case studies reveal equality directives in
operation, showing how these directives allow underserved groups to
participate in planning and policymaking, engage in front-end redesign of
programs and practices, and spur the adoption of practices and policies that
promote economic and social opportunity.
In Part IV, I examine the key challenges posed by equality directives,
and the steps that government actors and private groups should undertake
to more fully implement this emergent regime.
I
BEYOND ADJUDICATIVE ENFORCEMENT

Dominant accounts of civil rights statutes generally describe two types
of civil rights enforcement, private and public, both of which center on the
resolution of claims through adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative processes.
The first—and the most discussed in the academic commentary—is the
private attorney general model, which emphasizes enforcement by
individuals in courts, via individual or class action litigation. The second is
the public enforcement model, which involves the prosecution of claims in
courts and administrative tribunals. Commentators have described
American civil rights law as a struggle between the two, with private
enforcement emerging as the dominant, favored model.19 After presenting
these models, this Part argues that these dominant narratives omit a third
type of civil rights regulation: statutes and regulations that operate by
imposing a set of proactive duties on public actors in the administrative
state. Several civil rights statutes have included this form of regulation, but
it remains largely overlooked by commentators. In recent years, a set of
regulatory actions to enforce these statutes has instituted an American
version of “equality directives”20—a regime that differs in form and
operation from the dominant forms of civil rights regulation.

19 See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text (detailing the emergence of a private
enforcement model over a public one in American civil rights regulation).
20 See infra notes 142–143 and accompanying text (discussing equality directives in the
United Kingdom).

A.

The Private Attorney General: The Standard Account

Commentators that discuss civil rights statutes and their
implementation typically focus on the private attorney general model.21 As
I show in this section, the private attorney general model should continue to
be recognized as a tool for promoting equity, given its capacity to address
bias. However, recent Supreme Court cases have weakened the model. In
addition, as I discuss below, the private attorney general model has other,
more fundamental limitations as a mechanism for advancing equity and
inclusion.
1.

Supplementing State Capacity

Congress enacts civil rights statutes to promote antidiscrimination and
equity goals, and to empower private individuals to enforce those goals
through private litigation. The prime example is Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the fair employment provision that often serves as a shorthand
for civil rights.22 Title VII grants a private right of action to enforce its
provisions forbidding employment discrimination, allowing individuals to
litigate in court after exhausting administrative enforcement mechanisms.23
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to increase the incentives
for bringing private litigation, specifically by allowing individuals to seek
both compensatory and punitive damages.24 Through litigation in individual
and class actions, courts interpret the meaning of the substantive
prohibitions of the statute. The idea is that once a sufficient number of
cases are brought and high enough damages are awarded, employers—
whether faced with actual suits or to avoid the expense and adverse
publicity of future litigation—will alter their practices to comply with
court-endorsed interpretations of the statute.25
This model is known as the “private” attorney general because it
effectively delegates pursuit of the statute’s public goals to private parties.
As Pamela Karlan states, the “idea behind the ‘private attorney general’” is

21 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
183, 186 (arguing that “[v]irtually all modern civil rights statutes rely heavily on private attorneys
general”).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-17 (2006).
23 See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006) (granting individuals the right to bring suit after exhausting
claims with the EEOC).
24 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, § 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)).
25 See, e.g., Sean Farhang, Private Lawsuits, General Deterrence, and State Capacity:
Evidence from Job Discrimination Litigation 4–7, 29 (Oct. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the New York University Law Review) (summarizing commentary discussing the value
of private litigation and its potential deterrent effects).

simple: “Congress can vindicate important public policy goals by
empowering private individuals to bring suit.”26 The case for the private
attorney general, then, is that it supplements what even an ideally
constituted, well-funded, and vigorous public enforcement agency could
do. Private litigation engages the resources of a multitude of private actors
in rooting out discrimination.27 Private litigators and their clients may bring
greater passion, innovation, and effectiveness than public actors.28
For this reason, courts have explicitly acknowledged the role private
enforcement plays in supplementing inadequate public enforcement. In
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,29 one of the first Supreme Court
cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1964’s provision prohibiting
discrimination in public accommodations, the Court noted the limits of the
public attorney general—the Department of Justice (DOJ) could bring only
pattern-or-practice cases to enforce the statute—and endorsed strong
private enforcement to further the statute’s broader public policy goals.30
As the Court stated, a private civil rights plaintiff is no ordinary tort
plaintiff: “If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but
also as a ‘private attorney general,’ vindicating a policy that Congress
considered of the highest priority.”31
The Court was similarly explicit in several interpretations of the Fair
Housing Act (FHA) of 1968 in the initial decades after its enactment,
before the 1988 amendments to the Act strengthened the FHA’s weak
public and private enforcement provisions.32 With weak public enforcement

26

Karlan, supra note 21, at 186.
See Caroline R. Albiston & Laura Beth Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights:
The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087,
1094 (2007) (noting that private enforcement eliminates the need for a “large governmental
enforcement apparatus”); Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782,
788 (2011) (noting that private enforcement regimes can “supplement public efforts, picking up
the slack where agency resources run out”).
28 See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1387 (2000) (arguing that
a centralized regime of police misconduct prosecution lacks “the eyes, experiences, motivation,
and resources of millions of Americans who bear witness to institutionalized wrongdoing and are
willing to endure the expense of rooting it out”); Selmi, supra note 11, at 1404–05, 1444–47
(discussing reasons why government lawyers may drift towards less controversial, easier to win
cases).
29 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
30 Id. at 401 & n.2 (noting that when the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted, “it was
evident that enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part
upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law”).
31 Id. at 402.
32 From its inception, the FHA included a private right of action, but the Act’s private
enforcement provisions were weak, providing plaintiffs a short statute of limitations and courts a
limited ability to award damages and attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(b) (1970) (subjecting
27

capacity, the private enforcement that did occur was in large part enabled
by Court-announced rules expanding standing and explicitly invoking the
private attorney general function.33
Private enforcement also reflects deliberate congressional choices to
enforce public norms through litigation and (though less explicitly) to cope
with state incapacity. Encouraging private enforcement occurs through
explicit grants of private rights to sue,34 but it is also manifest in
congressional provisions granting attorneys’ fees to prevailing civil rights
plaintiffs,35 waiving sovereign immunity for damages actions,36 and
expanding damages for civil rights violations.37 In the 1988 amendments to
the FHA, key proponents recognized a need to strengthen the previously
weak private enforcement provisions.38 In the end, the amendments

FHA claims to a 180-day statute of limitations); 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(1) (1970) (capping punitive
damages at $1000). HUD, though charged with enforcing the statute, had no power to bring
enforcement actions, or even to hold hearings; rather, it had the power only to conciliate claims it
found meritorious, or seek civil penalties, which were set at low rates. Fair Housing Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, § 810(a), 82 Stat. 73, 85 (1968) (setting out the 1968 FHA’s administrative
enforcement regime). The weak enforcement provisions would hamper the Act’s effectiveness at
least until the 1988 Amendments. See GEORGE R. METCALF, FAIR HOUSING COMES OF AGE 4–5
(1988) (explaining that limitations on attorneys’ fees in the original FHA reduced the number of
attorneys willing to take cases). In addition, the original FHA allowed HUD to refer only a
limited set of cases to the DOJ for litigation—pattern-or-practice cases, or cases that raised an
issue of “general public importance.” 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a) (1970).
33 See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 208, 211 (1972) (noting that weak
public enforcement capacity rendered private suits the “main generating force” in the FHA); see
also Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982) (finding standing under the
FHA for fair housing testers—minorities and Whites who “pose as renters or purchasers for the
purpose of” determining whether housing providers and realtors are violating fair housing laws).
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109–15 (1979) (holding that a municipality
and four of its residents had standing to bring a claim against realtors illegally steering Blacks and
Whites seeking homes to different neighborhoods).
34 See, e.g., Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(i) (2006) (authorizing
private lawsuits after exhaustion of claims with the EEOC); Title VIII, Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (authorizing persons to bring suit in federal or state court without filing an
administrative complaint); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12117(a),
12188(a)(1) (2006) (detailing procedures for private enforcement in court).
35 See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)–(c)
(2006) (allowing prevailing plaintiffs in certain civil rights actions to recover attorneys’ fees); see
also Lemos, supra note 27, at 790–91 (describing congressional statutes that incentivize private
litigation through fee recovery).
36 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a) (2006) (abrogating a state’s sovereign immunity in
damages actions to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to d-7,
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88, and the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6101–07).
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006) (allowing prevailing plaintiffs the right to recover
compensatory and punitive damages not to exceed from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on
employer size).
38 See, e.g., Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1987: Hearing on S. 558 Before the Subcomm.

lengthened the statute of limitations and expanded plaintiffs’ ability to
recover attorneys’ fees and punitive damages.39 Similarly, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 authorized compensatory and punitive damages to enforce
certain provisions of Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA).40 Key drafters in committee reports recognized the damages
provisions as necessary to encourage victims to seek redress for
discrimination and to deter future acts of discrimination.41 These new
incentives likely explain the profound increase in the amount of private
litigation brought to enforce Title VII.42
More recently, members of Congress have invoked the private
attorney general as they craft responses to the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly43 and in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.44
These decisions moved away from the liberal pleading regime of Conley v.
Gibson45 by requiring that plaintiffs in federal courts plead their claims
with “plausibility.”46 This standard may have increased the pleading burden
on plaintiffs and made it more difficult to survive a motion to dismiss and
proceed to discovery, with potentially grave effects for the survival of
many civil rights claims.47 Some commentators argue that the cases’ impact

on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 64, 66 (1987) (statement of
Benjamin L. Hooks, Chief Executive Officer/Executive Director, NAACP) (“The chief defect in
the existing fair housing law is its lack of an adequate enforcement mechanism.”); METCALF,
supra note 32, at 21–23 (detailing advocacy and legislative efforts beginning in the mid-1970s to
strengthen the FHA).
39 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 813(a), (c),
102 Stat. 1619, 1633 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006)).
40 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §§ 102, 1977A, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
41 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-644, pt. 1, at 39–42, 44–45 (1990) (explaining the committee’s
view on the importance of ensuring that plaintiffs could recover damages, attorneys’ fees, and
expert fees); S. REP. NO. 101-315, at 32 (1990) (“The failure to provide compensatory and
punitive damages in Title VII leaves the statute without a meaningful deterrent for intentional
discrimination on the job.”).
42 In the six years following the passage of the 1991 Act, job discrimination lawsuits in
federal court increased by 211%. FARHANG, supra note 6, at 200. The newly enacted Title I of
the ADA partially accounts for this growth via increases in disability claims. But analyses of
EEOC filings suggest that increases in Title VII claims after the passage of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 were also responsible for much of this growth. Id. at 200–01.
43 550 U.S. 554 (2007).
44 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
45 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
46 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–80 (applying Twombly’s
plausibility standard to a civil rights claim).
47 See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter
Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 624 (2010) (finding a significantly higher rate of complaint
dismissals after Iqbal and Twombly than under the previous pleading regime and concluding that
“Twombly and Iqbal are poised to have their greatest impact on civil rights cases, simply because
those cases are by far the most likely type of case to be attacked by a 12(b)(6) motion”); Joseph

is vastly overstated.48 But at the very least the decisions increase the
discretion judges have to dismiss civil rights claims, potentially operating
as a kind of heightened pleading standard.49
The rules governing pleading, discovery, and access to courts—rules
created by Congress, administrative actors, and the judiciary—are
important planks in the foundation that enables the private attorney general.
In considering legislation to overturn Twombly and Iqbal, many members
of Congress explicitly invoked private enforcement as a key to vindicating
statutory and constitutional goals of equality.50 The implicit assumption is
that public enforcement is inadequate. Indeed, congressional responses
feature neither expansions of administrative capacity nor mechanisms to
prosecute civil rights claims.
2.

The Favored Model

The primacy of the private attorney general model was not inevitable,
but it has become the central conception of civil rights enforcement for
good reason: In the end, it was the best deal that civil rights advocates
could get from Congress. When Congress debated the fair employment
provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, civil rights supporters initially

A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1029–31 (finding a higher rate of dismissal in
Title VII opinions issued after Twombly).
48 See Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1298–99 (2010)
(arguing that Twombly and Iqbal can be read consistently with the case law on pleading that
preceded them); see also JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
CIVIL
RULES
28
(2011),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf (reporting to the
Federal Judicial Center a finding of no statistically significant increase in the number of motions
to dismiss granted in most types of civil cases after Iqbal and Twombly).
49 See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-dismissal Discovery
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
65, 65 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal have a distinct “detrimental effect” on “potentially
meritorious civil rights cases alleging intentional discrimination”); Suja A. Thomas, Oddball
Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 225–26 (arguing
that Twombly and Iqbal are likely to result in increased dismissal of employment discrimination
cases by importing a summary judgment standard of plausibility into the motion to dismiss, and
citing provisional data consistent with that conclusion); see also Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and
Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center's Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6
FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 7–8, 21–22, 28–31 (2012) (arguing that the FJC study’s data was incomplete
in significant respects, that the study set too high a threshold for statistical significance, and that
the study likely underestimates the cases’ effects on complaint filing and dismissals).
50 See, e.g., Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–3 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (discussing the importance of pleading standards in
allowing victims to enforce laws prohibiting discrimination).

pursued a bureaucratic enforcement regime of resolving complaints,
modeled on the National Labor Relations Act and state fair employment
practices commissions.51 The administrative agency would investigate
charges, determine if probable cause existed, conciliate claims, and if
conciliation failed, prosecute claims before the agency’s quasi-judicial
board.52 This initial model made administrative enforcement exclusive,
with no private right to sue in court.53 For civil rights proponents, the
administrative process was superior to the judicial process: cheaper,
quicker, less complex, more flexible, and more predictable and coherent
than private litigation.54 After opponents resisted the creation of powerful
federal administrative agencies with the authority to resolve civil rights
claims,55 private enforcement emerged as the compromise.56
So, while civil rights proponents might not have initially supported the
private attorney general model, by the time of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
private enforcement had emerged as the favored model. The Act provided
new compensatory and punitive damages for Title VII claims to enhance
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See FARHANG, supra note 6, at 98–99 (describing early visions of the EEOC).
Under initial proposals, the EEOC would have consisted of an Office of the Administrator
and a five-member board. Proponents envisioned the board as a quasi-judicial body appointed by
the President, confirmed by the Senate, and serving staggered seven-year terms. Id.
53 See id. at 99 (detailing the advantages civil rights advocates perceived in administrative
enforcement).
54 Id. at 99. Political scientist Sean Farhang documents the faith advocates placed in
administrative enforcement of individual claims and recounts their belief that administrative
agencies would be more expert, consistent, and “proactive[]” than courts. Id. at 100.
55 Opponents (and some supporters) of civil rights resisted these proposals for a range of
reasons, but most prominently because it would vest too much power in the federal government—
particularly in a single-mission federal agency like the EEOC. See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 146 (1990) (describing the original vision of the EEOC). Four years later,
opponents similarly resisted fair housing legislation that empowered HUD to investigate
complaints, hold evidentiary hearings, and issue enforcement orders. See METCALF, supra note
32, at 18 (recounting legislative moves stripping HUD of its authority to enforce housing claims).
56 See FARHANG, supra note 6, at 98–109 (detailing Title VII’s legislative history). Private
enforcement proposals emerged first, in a limited way, in House Republican amendments to Title
VII. See id. at 105 (documenting an initial amendment that would have granted a private cause of
action with Commission authorization and without attorneys’ fees). Civil rights proponents
successfully pushed Congress to enact a fee-shifting provision in Title VII. See ALFRED W.
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY 48 (1993) (arguing that advocates saw fees as necessary to ensure that claimants
could obtain counsel); FARHANG, supra note 6, at 111 (relaying the recollection of Jack
Greenberg, the former head of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF), that civil rights advocates
“supported counsel fees for prevailing plaintiffs as the only way to make private enforcement
feasible”). Similarly, private enforcement emerged as a compromise in housing discrimination,
though the FHA’s private enforcement mechanism was weaker than those in employment
discrimination. See Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to
Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1205–07 (2011) (describing the FHA’s
initially weak private enforcement regime).
52

private enforcement.57 A recent study by political scientist Sean Farhang
rethinks congressional moves to enhance private enforcement not simply as
the abdication of strong state enforcement of civil rights but as harnessing
private litigation to enhance state capacity.58 The damages provision of the
1991 Act, attorneys’ fees provisions, and Congress’s initial enactments of
private enforcement regimes thus can all be viewed as congressional moves
to harness courts to supplement government regulation.59 According to this
interpretation of civil rights enforcement, Congressional hearings and
proposed legislation in response to Iqbal and Twombly become part of the
same phenomenon—seeking to remove constraints on private court
enforcement rather than enhancing additional administrative enforcement
of Title VII or other civil rights statutes.
The private attorney general model also pervades scholarly reactions
to other civil rights statutes. For example, the Supreme Court has limited
the enforcement of another key provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act:
Title VI, which prohibits discrimination by entities that receive federal
funding.60 In Alexander v. Sandoval,61 the Court declined to imply a private
right of action to enforce the disparate impact regulations of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. From the perspective of civil rights advocates,
the decision was nothing less than a tragedy. Sandoval ended a nascent
litigation strategy that invoked Title VI’s disparate impact regulations to
address contemporary racial disparities in the use of federal and state
transportation resources, health care access, and environmental quality.62
Professor Pamela Karlan grouped Sandoval with a series of cases that made
it difficult or impossible to bring private enforcement actions. She argued
that the case was part of a trend of Supreme Court jurisprudence
“disarming the private attorney general.”63
Yet describing Title VI as a “private attorney general statute” is
awkward—not because Sandoval was correct in holding that no private

57 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, §§ 102, 1977A(a)–(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–73
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)).
58 See FARHANG, supra note 6, at 3–4 (arguing that Congress makes a “legislative choice” in
relying on private litigation in statutory implementation).
59 See id. at 190–92 (providing an account of congressional intent to shore up private
enforcement of Title VII through creation of a damages remedy).
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (forbidding programs and activities receiving federal funds
from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or national origin).
61 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
62 See Philip Tegeler, Title VI Enforcement in the Post-Sandoval Era, POVERTY & RACE
(Poverty & Race Research Action Council, D.C.), Sept./Oct. 2010, at 5 (“The scope of what civil
rights advocates and their clients lost in Sandoval is staggering . . . .”).
63 Karlan, supra note 21, at 183, 187.

remedy existed to enforce Title VI’s disparate impact regulations,64 but
because Title VI is not written as a classic private attorney general statute.
Rather, Title VI primarily uses bureaucratic power to promote racial equity
goals and to cleanse federal funds of discrimination.65 For that reason, Title
VI is more accurately seen not just as a source of individual rights in
federally funded programs,66 but also as imposing a set of duties on
federally funded recipients: duties to not discriminate and broader duties to
promote equity.67 Despite this structure, Title VI has come to be seen
primarily as just another statute in the private attorney general arsenal. This
suggests the dominance of the private attorney general model in our
conception of civil rights law and the perceived lack of value associated
with public enforcement. Even more, it reveals implicit skepticism about an
alternative that Title VI would seem to allow: relying on the state to
promote equity norms through regulatory and programmatic means.
3.

Limitations
Given the potential power of private litigation and the longstanding

64 Section 601 of Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subject to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Despite the lack of an explicit private right of action in the statute, Court
decisions prior to Sandoval had endorsed the view that the statute created a private remedy for
violations of section 601. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 593–95
(1983) (White, J.) (holding that legislative history and the Court’s prior decisions supported such
a holding). Sandoval is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recent aversion to implied private
rights of action. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 276 (2002) (finding that the
Federal Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act could not be privately enforced using 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1984 & Supp. V 2000)).
65 See infra notes 131–136 and accompanying text (recounting the emergence of Title VI).
66 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“No person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
67 See infra text accompanying notes 137–141 (describing the agency equality directives
promulgated to enforce Title VI and Title VIII). Karlan recognizes this when she notes that the
Sandoval Court should have asked whether section 602 of the statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000d-1, “contemplates allowing private parties to enforce the obligations that regulations impose
on the recipients of federal funds,” and not simply whether it was a source of individual rights.
Karlan, supra note 21, at 198. Under this conception, private attorneys general are not simply
delegated to vindicate congressional policy. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400,
401–02 (1968) (describing the private attorney general’s function). They are akin to qui tam
litigants—private persons who use statutory and common law mechanisms to sue on behalf of the
government for legal violations and earn a portion of the recovery—enforcing a duty that is owed
to the government but improperly enforced by the government. See Karlan, supra note 21, at
198–99 (comparing the private attorney general and qui tam models). This latter analogy is
particularly apt in describing the relationship between private parties and public authorities in
Title VI and Title VIII. See infra Part IV.C.1.a (describing the role of litigation in helping to
enforce and strengthen fair housing equality directives).

and deep American attachment to courts as a forum for vindicating rights,68
the dominant view risks obscuring the downsides of the private attorney
general model. For example, the success of private enforcement depends
heavily on the judicial embrace of rules governing pleading, summary
judgment, standing, and fee recovery that make private enforcement
possible.69 As noted above, some of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions
have interpreted procedural and litigation-enabling rules in ways that
hinder private enforcement.70 Similarly, the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes—involving claims of systemic
gender discrimination in pay and promotion practices—tightened the
requirements for class actions in cases seeking monetary damages71 for
discriminatory employment practices.72 Wal-Mart powerfully illustrates the
tensions involved in the private attorney general model. Class actions
provide a potential way to surmount some of the problems of pursuing
discrimination claims through individualized action. For instance, they
allow for the aggregation of smaller claims and provide an avenue for
structural and injunctive relief that is often elusive or unsought in
individual claims. The Supreme Court in the past has recognized
employment discrimination cases as paradigmatic class actions, noting that
“suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often by their very nature
class suits, involving class-wide wrongs.”73 But, while the damages
provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act incentivize attorneys to bring

68 See KAGAN, supra note 9, at 14–16 (describing America’s historic reliance on private
litigation as an alternative to bureaucratic regulation and government authority).
69 See Lemos, supra note 27, at 823–30 (detailing how judges respond to perceptions of
excessive litigation by narrowing their interpretations of fee-shifting, standing, pleading, and
other statutes that create litigation incentives).
70 See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text (describing the impact of the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal).
71 See 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557–61 (2011). In Wal-Mart, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled
that the plaintiffs’ backpay claims could not be certified as a class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), because their monetary relief claims required individualized calculation
of damages and thus were not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief sought. Id. at 2557.
72 The Court held 5-4 that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality
requirement because they lacked “significant proof” that Wal-Mart “operat[ed] under a general
policy of discrimination.” Id. at 2554 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159
n.15 (1982)). In so holding, the majority discounted the plaintiffs’ expert, as well as statistical and
anecdotal evidence that Wal-Mart’s corporate culture and systems for determining pay and
advancement pervasively discriminated against women throughout the company’s stores. WalMart, 131 S. Ct. at 2553–56; see also id. at 2563–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing
plaintiffs’ evidence of systemic and nationwide discrimination).
73 E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977). For a discussion
of the pre-Wal-Mart approach to class actions, see Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination
Class Actions Survive, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004). Hart notes that “employment
discrimination cases have typified the sort of civil rights action that courts and commentators
describe as uniquely suited to resolution by class action litigation.” Id. at 813.

employment discrimination cases, including class actions, the recent WalMart decision creates significant barriers to pursuing monetary damages
cases as nationwide class actions.74
In addition to recently created judicial barriers to private enforcement,
reliance on litigation has longstanding and well-documented costs and
challenges. Litigation can be time-consuming, protracted, and inefficient,
exacting great financial and emotional costs on litigants.75 When Congress
incentivizes litigation, it increases the workload for federal (and often state)
courts.76 The volume of fair employment litigation is a particular focal
point for debates about the costs and value of litigation; courts and
commentators often frame judicial rules tightening pleading and summary
judgment as a response to such cases.77 Normative views aside,
employment cases are often perceived as flooding courts and thus
dismissed as frivolous.78 As a result, as Professor Margaret Lemos argues,
efforts to enhance litigation through fee-shifting and damages
enhancements may have the perverse effect of leading to increased hostility
to plaintiffs’ claims, whether they actually increase litigation or not.79
Moreover, even if one rejects the claim that there is too much
litigation compared to the number of actual civil rights injuries,
overreliance on private litigation may skew the nature of civil rights
enforcement. Attorneys have an incentive to pursue primarily cases with
high damages or easily identifiable injuries. For instance, researchers have
documented a shift in Title VII employment cases away from cases focused

74 However, the Court left open the possibility that some claims for monetary relief might still
be certified under Rule 23(b)(2). See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (declining to reach the
“broader” question of whether Rule 23(b)(2) “applies only to requests for such injunctive or
declaratory relief and does not authorize the class certification of monetary claims at all”).
75 See Lemos, supra note 27, at 789–90 (noting that the expense of litigation is often not
worth the cost); see also KAGAN, supra note 9, at 104–25 (detailing some of the pitfalls of
America’s civil justice system, including the high costs, inefficiencies, and injustice generated by
redundancy, complexity, and adversarialism).
76 For instance, Professor Farhang has found a rise in federal court litigation immediately
following the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which enhanced private enforcement capacity. See
FARHANG, supra note 6, at 200–01 (documenting the “abrupt and steep increase in job
discrimination lawsuits” in federal courts following enactment of the 1991 Act and contending
that much of this increase is attributable to the Act’s changes to Title VII).
77 See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice:
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
517, 564–66 (2010) (describing the possible connection between judicial skepticism about the
merit of employment discrimination cases and the rise in summary judgments and Federal Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals).
78 See Lemos, supra note 27, at 826–27 (documenting judicial and scholarly concern about
“frivolous” litigation).
79 See id. at 784–85 (arguing that litigation incentives may trigger judicial backlash).

on hiring and toward those focused on firing and promotion.80 This may, of
course, reflect a decrease in actual incidents of hiring discrimination—but
more likely it suggests that hiring discrimination is harder to identify and,
when litigated, generates fewer damages.81 This shift away from hiring
discrimination and toward high-damage cases likely makes Title VII
litigation less effective for addressing the problems of low-income
individuals and those seeking to enter the job market.
Additionally, by placing the burden on the individual to complain,
entire areas of civil rights may go underenforced. For instance, despite the
pervasiveness of housing discrimination and the incentives created by the
FHA, relatively few housing discrimination cases are brought, particularly
when compared to documented incidents of discrimination.82 The 1988
amendments to the FHA made private enforcement easier, but led to only a
modest upswing in litigation.83 In part, this may be because—like
discrimination in hiring—many aspects of housing discrimination are hard
to identify. In failure-to-rent and in steering cases (directing housing
seekers to particular neighborhoods and away from others on the basis of
race or ethnicity), victims are often unaware and fail to come forward.84
I do not mean to downplay the importance of the private attorney
general. As noted above, its centrality to conceptions of civil rights
enforcement is well earned. Such litigation can prompt real change.85 But it

80 See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 1015–17 (1991) (explaining an empirical
analysis showing that, while hiring cases dominated EEOC and court dockets in 1966, by 1985
wrongful termination charges significantly outnumbered hiring cases).
81 See id. at 1017 & n.107 (arguing that it is unlikely that hiring discrimination has decreased
given the persistence of discrimination in termination and noting that hiring cases are likely to
generate fewer monetary damages than termination cases).
82 See MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE I HDS 2000, at iii-v
(2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/Publications/pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf (showing
the prevalence of contemporary discrimination in metropolitan housing); Johnson, supra note 56,
at 1201–04 (detailing the challenges of individual enforcement in housing).
83 See Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate (and What Can Be Done
About It)?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 465–67 (2007) (providing evidence that the 1988
amendments have done little to spur litigation or to significantly diminish housing
discrimination).
84 See John Goering, An Overview of Key Issues in the Field of Fair Housing Research, in
FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES: GOVERNMENT, HOUSING, AND FAIRNESS 19, 28 (John Goering
ed., 2007) (explaining that only a fraction of actual victims of housing discrimination make use of
the enforcement system).
85 See, e.g., Farhang, supra note 25, at 29–31 (concluding from empirical evidence that the
threat of private enforcement litigation led employers to adopt equal opportunity practices that
improved employment outcomes for women and minorities, but noting that the data failed to
establish that private enforcement regimes were more effective than administrative enforcement
regimes).

is crucial to understand the limitations as well as the value of the regime in
addressing civil rights problems today.
B.

The Usual Meaning of Public Enforcement

Critics typically measure the limitations of the private enforcement
model against public enforcement, which has become the less desirable
alternative. In the civil rights context, public enforcement generally means
one of two things. The first is public enforcement of claims through
litigation in court, such as claims of discrimination brought by the DOJ or
by other federal agencies with standing, including the EEOC. The second is
the administrative adjudication of federal civil rights claims.86 As I discuss
next, these forms of public enforcement can serve as an important
complement to private enforcement by bringing public attention and
resources to civil rights cases, particularly those cases unlikely to receive
adequate attention from the private bar. But the structural and practical
weaknesses of agencies tasked with enforcing civil rights has limited their
public enforcement capacity.
1.

The Potential of Public Enforcement

Federal agencies have public enforcement capacities that complement
the private attorney general models prevalent in housing and employment.
In the context of employment, the EEOC has investigative and
prosecutorial authority to enforce a range of federal employment laws,
including Title VII, the ADA, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA).87 Under Title VII, for instance, individuals must first file a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC, and the EEOC then has 180 days
after filing to investigate the claim.88 After 180 days an individual may
request that the EEOC issue a “Notice of Right to Sue,” which allows the

86 These two functions can also operate as a hybrid, as in the case of HUD. See infra notes
92–95 and accompanying text (describing HUD’s powers under the Fair Housing Act).
87 Congress amended Title VII in 1972, vesting the EEOC with authority to bring suits in
court. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA), Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 103,
104 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (2006)) (“[T]he Commission, or
the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision, may bring an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief pending final
disposition of such charge.”).
88 See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f) (2006) (detailing the procedures for filing a
Title VII charge with the EEOC and for bringing claims in court); see also Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626 (2006) (providing that plaintiffs may pursue a civil
action sixty days after filing a charge with the EEOC); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006) (adopting the filing and exhaustion requirements of Title VII).
Administrative exhaustion is not required for employment discrimination claims filed pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006) or under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).

claimant to proceed with a complaint in federal or state court.89 If the
EEOC finds merit in a charge of discrimination, the agency lacks power to
adjudicate the claim, but the parties may enter into conciliation procedures
with the EEOC to resolve the claim. If the conciliation is unsuccessful, the
EEOC may file suit on behalf of the claimant or itself in court.90 The
Attorney General can also bring “pattern or practice” cases.91
In the context of housing, the FHA grants HUD authority to
investigate claims of discrimination while simultaneously seeking to
conciliate the claim.92 Additionally, the 1988 Amendments to the FHA
created a new administrative enforcement scheme that allows victims to
pursue claims before administrative law judges (ALJs).93 If HUD
determines that reasonable cause exists for the discrimination claim, it files
a charge with the ALJ. At that point either party may elect to proceed in
federal district court. If neither party does so, the case is heard by an ALJ,
who has the power to issue a ruling and grant compensatory damages,
injunctive relief, and civil penalties up to $50,000.94 All parties may be
represented by counsel in proceedings before HUD ALJs.95
The benefits of public enforcement by the Attorney General can be
significant. Public agencies bring substantial litigation and investigative
resources to tackle civil rights problems. The DOJ in particular may have a
greater capacity to bring systemic claims than individuals. Moreover, fear
of unleashing the state’s investigative and enforcement apparatus may
prompt defendants to settle their claims and may curb discriminatory
behavior by others. Cases brought by federal agencies may garner greater
press and public attention and thus serve as a powerful mechanism for
remedying discrimination. Furthermore, in some areas, the federal
government has practical tools for enforcement unavailable to private
litigants. For instance, HUD has the power to conduct housing tests96 and
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See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1) (detailing administrative exhaustion requirements).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (describing procedures for bringing suit).
91 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (2006) (authorizing the Attorney General to enforce employment
laws when he or she “has reasonable cause to believe that any person or group of persons is
engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights secured by
[the] subchapter . . .”).
92 See 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)–(b) (2006) (authorizing aggrieved persons to file a complaint with
HUD and describing the investigative and conciliation processes). If the complaint comes from a
state or locality with “substantially equivalent” fair housing laws, the complaint is referred to that
state’s civil rights agency. Id. § 3610(f).
93 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 812, 102 Stat. 1619,
1629–33 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3612(b) (2006)).
94 Id. § 812(g)(3), 102 Stat. at 1629–30.
95 Id. § 812(c), 102 Stat. at 1629.
96 In fair housing tests, minorities and Whites are sent to seek housing from real estate agents
or landlords to detect discrimination against minorities. The minorities and Whites are presented
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can bring claims based on the results of tests and other investigations, even
without the presence of an actual victim.97
In the second conception of public enforcement, agencies provide
catalyzation for the resolution of antidiscrimination claims. The EEOC
lacks adjudicative capacity, but does have the ability to investigate claims
and seek conciliation agreements between parties. The strongest civil rights
administrative enforcement scheme, at least on paper, now belongs to
HUD.98 The potential advantages of the HUD system are numerous. Given
the expense and time of litigation, proponents of the 1988 amendments
bolstered administrative enforcement to serve as a cheaper, less
burdensome way of securing compliance with the FHA.99
2.

The Less Favored Alternative

As noted above, proponents initially desired strong administrative
enforcement of the federal civil rights laws. The reality of enforcement has
often proved less palatable. In terms of prosecutorial and adjudicative
effectiveness, the empirical analyses of agency enforcement are sobering.
The EEOC is consistently plagued with backlogs and long delays in
investigating and processing claims.100 Meanwhile, staffing and other
administrative problems have historically hampered HUD’s ability to
investigate discrimination claims.101 Empirical studies also show low rates
of usage of the ALJ process by HUD claimants as compared with federal
courts.102 When ALJs adjudicate cases, they tend to award much lower

as comparable on all characteristics except minority status. See JOHN YINGER, CLOSED DOORS,
OPPORTUNITIES LOST: THE CONTINUING COSTS OF HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 21–22 (1995)
(describing fair housing audit and testing methodology).
97 See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (2006) (allowing HUD to initiate complaints).
98 See Johnson, supra note 56, at 1191 (describing fair housing’s formal enforcement
regime—the result of congressional amendments in 1988 to strengthen its previously weak
enforcement regime—as the “strongest of any civil rights statute”).
99 See H.R. REP. NO. 100-711, at 17 (1988) (describing the 1988 Amendments to the FHA as
intended to strengthen private and administrative enforcement); Michael H. Schill, Implementing
the Federal Housing Act: The Adjudication of Complaints, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES,
supra note 84, at 143, 146–47 (describing the history of the FHA Amendments of 1988).
100 See, e.g., OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS, EQUAL EMP’T OPP. COMM’N, ANNUAL
REPORT ON THE FEDERAL WORK FORCE (2009) (finding that only 72.9% of EEOC complaints
were investigated in a timely fashion in fiscal year 2009).
101 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-463, FAIR HOUSING: OPPORTUNITIES
TO IMPROVE HUD’S OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS (2004),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/242111.pdf (noting that staffing and training
problems hampered HUD’s ability to conduct investigations, despite finding an increase in timely
completed investigations); U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENTS
OF 1988: THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS 222 (1994) (analyzing four years of enforcement after the
enactment of the FHAA and finding HUD complaint management procedures “deficient”).
102 Schill, supra note 99, at 143, 156–59.

penalties than those gained for similar cases in court proceedings.103
Administrative enforcement is also inconsistent for structural and
political reasons. Some presidential administrations may fail to vigorously
enforce civil rights laws or may change or alter priorities in particular
areas.104 Similarly, congressional oversight of agency action might be weak
or nonexistent, depending on members’ interests, politics, and competing
priorities. In addition, the government’s dual role as enforcer of civil rights
and defendant in civil rights cases may lead it to adopt positions less
favorable to civil rights claimants.105
Civil rights scholars are generally skeptical about the potential for
enforcement through administrative adjudication or public attorneys
general. Comparing the EEOC and HUD’s enforcement record with those
of private litigants, Professor Michael Selmi argues that a fundamental
problem in government lawyering is that government lawyers are generally
less vigorous, innovative, and passionate than private attorneys.106 The
statutory requirements for civil rights agencies are another obstacle. For
example, Title VII requires individuals first to exhaust their claims with the
EEOC. But the agency is crippled under the weight of processing

103 See id. at 167 (showing a discrepancy between the median monetary awards granted by
HUD ALJs and in district court).
104 For instance, civil rights advocates heavily criticized the DOJ civil rights division under
President Reagan for failure to enforce voting rights laws and for its positions opposing
affirmative action and busing. See Robert Pear, Reagan Defends Justice Dept. Nominee as
Opposition Rises, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1985, at A25 (describing civil rights opposition to the
promotion of civil rights division chief Bradford Reynolds to a higher position within the DOJ,
based on his failure to enforce civil rights laws in education, voting, housing, and employment);
see also Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Why Reynolds Lost, CIVIL RIGHTS
MONITOR (Aug. 1985), http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/august1985/art2p1.html (arguing that
the division under Reynolds had “the worst civil rights record of any administration in more than
half a century—in education, housing, voting, employment, disability rights, and women’s
rights”). Similarly, civil rights advocates and some members of Congress criticized the
administration of George W. Bush for failure to enforce civil rights laws. See, e.g., Edward M.
Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211, 212–24 (2008)
(arguing that the Bush Administration politicized hiring and other enforcement decisions in the
civil rights division, failed to vigorously enforce the law in voting and employment, and severely
decreased the number of disparate impact cases); Charlie Savage, Report Examines Civil Rights
Enforcement During Bush Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at A26 (describing the results of a
report by the General Accounting Office on the Bush Administration’s civil rights failures,
including the failure to investigate an allegation of voter intimidation against Black voters and
general declines in the pursuit of employment discrimination cases involving race and gender).
105 See Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 300–01 (1994) (describing the Reagan
Administration’s advancement of arguments at “odds with pro-plaintiff” EEOC positions in order
to defend the government against employment discrimination suits); Selmi, supra note 11, at
1450–51 (arguing that the government’s dual role as plaintiff and defendant creates conflicts).
106 Selmi, supra note 11, at 1404–05, 1458 (arguing that it is time to “reconsider whether there
is any proper role for the federal government in prosecuting civil rights actions”).

individual claims, has the capacity to investigate only a few, and in the end
determines that the vast majority of claims have no merit.107 The agency
appears to some commentators primarily as a hindrance to quick judicial
resolution of plaintiffs’ claims, superintending an administrative process
that in the end is “strange and vacuous.”108 The shift to emphasizing private
enforcement of Title VII and other federal employment discrimination
claims in the 1991 Civil Rights Act represents the gradual culmination of a
loss of faith in the use of executive power to implement Title VII.109
Similarly, HUD by some accounts is a “weak institutional home” for civil
rights enforcement—big and lumbering, serving multiple roles, and
controlled by interests actively hostile to civil rights.110 As a result, civil
rights advocates have called for federal actors to move civil rights
enforcement authority outside of HUD to a separate dedicated enforcement
agency akin to the EEOC, or to an agency combined with the EEOC.111
In the end, researchers and civil rights commentators find little
favorable to say about the enforcement efficacy of administrative agencies
or, in the case of the EEOC, its formal statutory role.112 To be sure, civil
rights advocates continue to appeal for strengthened federal agency
capacity, recognizing its potential value.113 Academic commentators seem
less hopeful: Attention in legal commentary to public enforcement often
ends with a call for strengthening mechanisms for private enforcement.114

107 See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in
Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7–10, 21–22 (1996) (describing the EEOC
filing process, reviewing data from fiscal year 1992, and concluding that the “agency receives
approximately ninety thousand claims a year but only about fifteen percent of those claims obtain
relief as a result of the EEOC's actions during the process”).
108 Id. at 10.
109 See FARHANG, supra note 6, at 111–13 (explaining why civil rights advocates came to
accept private enforcement).
110 CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S
ATTEMPT TO DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 139 (2006) (reviewing HUD’s housing desegregation
efforts during the Nixon Administration and arguing that HUD’s multiple, divergent purposes
hampered its capacity to enforce civil rights).
111 See NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR
HOUSING 19 (2008) (recommending the creation of an independent fair housing enforcement
agency).
112 See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35
Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 309–10
(2001) (“[B]y starting the EEOC as a charge-handling agency, rather than an enforcement agency,
the EEOC has been forced to focus on handling charges instead of pursuing enforcement
initiatives.”).
113 See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON FAIR HOUS. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 111
(recommending specific strategies to strengthen federal fair housing enforcement).
114 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 11, at 1459; see also David L. Rose, Twenty-five Years Later:
Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1121, 1172 (1989) (“The problems of the EEOC have become so pervasive and endemic that

C.

A Third Model: American Equality Directives

Standard academic conceptions of civil rights implementation center
on judicial and quasi-judicial models for resolving claims. The current
account of institutional choice for civil rights enforcement involves debates
over the best place for adjudication (court or agency) and who should
prosecute (public or private actors).115 Omitted from this account is the fact
that the Civil Rights Act of 1964—which by these accounts ushered in an
emphasis on private enforcement—also contained Title VI. Title VI targets
bureaucratic enforcement. Standard conceptions of civil rights enforcement
also fail to properly account for Title VIII of the Fair Housing Act of 1968,
which requires federal agencies to “affirmatively” “further fair housing.”116
In effect, these narratives overlook another strand in the civil rights
regulatory regime: statutes and implementing regulations that operate as
directives to the administrative state.
I demonstrate below that statutes like Title VI and Title VIII are
structured to engage federal administrative power not only by promoting
compliance by public and private discriminators, but also by targeting the
administrative state—the set of federal, state, and local programs enabled
by federal funding—as the very object of the enforcement or rule-setting
activity. Under these statutes, a set of regulatory requirements has emerged
that places proactive and affirmative duties on federally funded actors. My
aim is not to present these equality directives as a solution to all the
limitations of traditional or public and private enforcement, or to argue that
they should supplant those important models. Rather, it is to show that the
exclusive focus on public and private enforcement ignores a form of
regulatory intervention that can powerfully augment traditional forms of
civil rights implementation. Equality directives harness agencies’
regulatory capacity, not just their enforcement or claim-resolution capacity.
And, because of a set of specific features that I describe below, these
directives have the power to do more than combat discrimination or bias.
Rather, equality directives aim at redesigning government programs and
policies—in housing, transportation, agriculture, and other areas—to

some former high-ranking officials of the Commission have expressed their doubts as to whether
the continued existence of the Commission is in the public interest.”).
115 See, e.g., FARHANG, supra note 6, at 98–106 (discussing, in the context of the enactment of
Title VII, the House of Representatives’ choice between an NLRB-type model that focused on
administrative adjudication with a “prosecutorial” model that enhanced private prosecutorial
power); LIEBERMAN, supra note 9, at 149–50 (comparing America’s decentralized, litigationcentered approach to civil rights enforcement to Great Britain’s creation of a single agency to
oversee antidiscrimination enforcement); Selmi, supra note 11, at 1416–22 (comparing agency
and private enforcement of Title VII and Title VIII).
116 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006).

address the way inequality and exclusion operate in contemporary
American society.
In the next section, I provide an overview of the statutes and
regulations that create “equality directives.” I discuss the key features of
these statutes and regulations that both distinguish them from traditional
civil rights enforcement regimes and give them a power that is particularly
salient today. In Part III, I will build on this introduction to provide a more
detailed elaboration of how this regulatory regime operates in the two key
areas of transportation and housing.
1.

Overview of Equality Directive Statutes and Regulations

As my primary examples of equality directives, I use the regulatory
regimes implementing Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title VIII
of the Fair Housing Act.117 Title VI prohibits racial and ethnic
discrimination in federal spending, which covers federal programs and
activities as well as state and local entities receiving federal funds.118 A key
provision in Title VIII requires that federal agencies and grant recipients
affirmatively pursue fair housing.119 By placing positive duties on state
actors, these regimes build on the antidiscrimination base provided by these
statutes.
These core civil rights statutes are long-standing, but the strengthening
and specifying of affirmative duties under these statutes are relatively
recent. For instance, a recent Department of Transportation (DOT)
guidance implementing Title VI requires state and local actors receiving
urban transit funds to assess whether their programs and activities have a
deleterious impact on racial and ethnic groups, to include racial and ethnic
minorities in their planning, and to consider less discriminatory
alternatives.120 Similarly, a 2003 guidance from the Department of
Agriculture implementing Title VI requires federal agencies and their
grantees to conduct a “civil rights impact analysis” that analyzes the

117 Another example outside Title VI and Title VIII is the recently enacted statutory
requirement that federal grantees address racial disparities in the juvenile justice system. See 42
U.S.C. § 5633(15) (2006). For a discussion, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 374 (2007). The juvenile justice directives stem from a statute enacted in 1992,
while here I focus on directives emerging from longstanding civil rights statutes.
118 Section 601 of Title VI provides that “no person . . . shall, on the ground of race, color, or
national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (2006).
119 See Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of HUD to
administer their programs and activities to “affirmatively further the policies” of the Fair Housing
Act); see id. § 5304(b)(2) (requiring the same of federal community development grantees).
120 FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at IV-4, V-6 to -7.

proposed effect of their policies and actions on racial and ethnic minorities
and persons with disabilities.121 Regulations implementing Title VI also
require the DOT to assess whether any negative environmental and health
impacts fall disproportionately on particular racial and ethnic groups and
on low-income populations, and to take steps to mitigate these concerns.122
Title VIII is explicitly affirmative in its statutory mandate, requiring
that agencies and grantees take proactive steps to promote fair housing
goals.123 A range of regulations, executive orders, and agency guidance
documents make this statutory mandate more specific. These rules require
agencies and grantees to promote racial and economic integration in
selecting sites for subsidized and public housing; to assess and remove
barriers to integration and inclusion at the state and local levels; to collect
data on the effects of federally funded housing programs on segregation
and integration; and to structure housing vouchers and homeless assistance
programs to allow recipients to live in low-poverty neighborhoods.124 As is
evident from the above account, these requirements range in kind. Some
statutes and regulations place broad normative goals on state actors to
promote equity, such as requiring federal agencies and grantees to take
steps to “further fair housing” or to avoid “discrimination.”125 Others
require states and localities to self-assess as to whether their actions are
causing harm to particular groups and to take steps to remove that harm.126
Some statutes require the inclusion of affected communities (including
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See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 1, 4.
See FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at II-1, IV-4 (explaining required environmental and
health assessments for the Federal Transit Agency); U.S. DOT, Order on Environmental Justice
to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, Ord.
5610.2, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,377 (Apr. 15, 1997).
123 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006) (requiring HUD to administer its programs and
activities “in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of [the Fair Housing Act]”); 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(d) (“All executive departments and agencies shall administer their programs and activities
relating to housing and urban development . . . in a manner affirmatively to further the purposes
of this subchapter and shall cooperate with the Secretary [of Housing] to further such purposes.”).
124 See infra notes 231–240 and accompanying text (describing HUD’s Fair Housing Planning
Guide, which provides civil rights guidance for certain recipients of federal housing funds).
125 See, e.g., Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (forbidding discrimination by federal funding
recipients); Title VIII, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006) (imposing a duty on federal agencies to
“further” fair housing and providing the same for federal grantees); 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2)
(2010) (forbidding funding recipients from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration
which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or
national origin”); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2011) (forbidding discrimination by those receiving
funds from the DOT).
126 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 570.487(b)(1)–(4) (2012) (requiring an impediments analysis by
community development grantees); FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at V-5 to V-7 (requiring
impact analysis for certain service and fare changes).
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underrepresented communities) in their planning.127 Yet all require frontend planning with the goal of equity and inclusion. As a result, this
regulatory framework has provided the impetus for changes in policies and
programs that alter the very landscape that allows inequality. For instance,
this framework has led decisionmakers to change who benefits from public
transit and housing programs, to determine where public transit and
subsidized housing are located, and to lift zoning and other barriers to
housing integration.128 This regulatory approach does more than require
that governments address bias against minority or other groups.129 It
requires entities to rethink and redesign government-supported structures to
proactively promote the inclusion of groups that, whether through
discrimination, historic exclusion, or structural difference, are
disadvantaged socially and economically.
2.

Essential Features

These directives take a different approach to achieving racial and
other forms of inclusion than do the standard public and private
enforcement models. Their essential attributes are that (1) they are
regulatory in their approach; (2) they are affirmative and not just
prohibitory; and (3) they impose a set of pervasive duties for federal-state
programs.
a.

Regulatory Directives to the Administrative State

The first way in which these statutes differ from the standard private
attorney general or public enforcement model is that they are centered on
regulatory, not adjudicative power. Title VI engages the various levels of
the administrative state—federal agencies and state and local governments
who receive federal funds—to adopt rules and policies to promote statutory
goals of antidiscrimination, inclusion, and equity.130 Title VIII’s
“affirmatively furthering” provision is similarly directed at federal agencies

127 See, e.g., FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at IV-4 (requiring grantees to conduct outreach to
minority, low-income, and limited English proficient (LEP) populations and include these groups
in their planning); OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 5 (requiring as part of the civil rights
impact analysis that agencies “[c]onsult with stakeholders, advisory committees, and customers,
as appropriate, to obtain input prior to decision-making”).
128 See infra notes 206–215 and accompanying text (providing examples of state and local
implementation of transit equality directives); notes 249–252 and accompanying text (discussing
state implementation of housing equality directives).
129 See infra Part II.C (arguing that civil rights interventions need to move beyond their current
focus on remedying bias).
130 Title VI also applies to private actors who receive federal funds, but my focus here is on
how it regulates public actors.

and grantees; key drafters of the provision announced it as a mechanism to
engage the federal government’s programmatic, enforcement, and spending
leverage to promote integration and counter its past history of segregation.
If Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act mainly creates a private
mechanism to enforce civil rights, then Title VI, the 1964 Civil Rights
Act’s other major provision, engages bureaucratic mechanisms for the
same purpose. Title VI has two obvious strands. First, it provides an
individual right to be free from discrimination in federally funded
programs.131 Second, it provides a bureaucratic, non-adjudicative
mechanism that the federal government can use to enforce
antidiscrimination norms on subnational levels of government.132 This is
the carrot-and-stick element of Title VI that commentators acknowledge
played an instrumental role in integrating southern school districts.133
Title VI can also be understood in a third way: as a statute focused on
state power itself. The statute announces an antidiscrimination norm for
federal funds and it aims to purge states of their complicity in
discrimination and segregation.134 With the expansion of federal grant-inaid programs, federal funds became a new extension of the state, and
purging these federal funds of discrimination was a key goal for civil rights
proponents.135 When President Kennedy celebrated the enactment of Title

131 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (declaring that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”).
132 See id. § 2000d-1 (empowering agencies to enforce their regulations by terminating
funding or “by any other means authorized by law”). More specifically, proponents of Title VI
aimed to make Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), a reality in the face of noncompliance
by Southern school districts. As a White House Report stated in 1966 after Congress enacted Title
VI, the statute aimed to “remove school desegregation efforts from the courts, where they had
been bogged down for more than a decade.” WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO
FULFILL THESE RIGHTS 41 (1966).
133 See JOEL F. HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW
REFORM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 114–15 (1978) (arguing that federal executive enforcement of
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act helped quicken the pace of school integration, even though
overall progress remained slow).
134 Title VI’s predecessors are the New Deal Executive Orders forbidding employment
discrimination by federal agencies and by government contractors. See HAVARD SITKOFF, A NEW
DEAL FOR BLACKS: THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AS A NATIONAL ISSUE 321 (1978)
(discussing Executive Order 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 25, 1941), which established a
Committee on Fair Employment Practices in the Office of Personnel Management). In 1951,
President Eisenhower extended prohibitions on employment discrimination to recipients of
federal contracts. See Exec. Order No. 10,479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953) (banning discrimination
by contractors on federally financed construction sites).
135 President Eisenhower stated as early as 1953 that “wherever Federal funds are expended
for anything, I do not see how any American can justify—legally, or logically, or morally—a
discrimination in expenditure of those funds as among our citizens.” Dwight D. Eisenhower, The

VI, he spoke of a responsibility inherent in federal funding and programs.
“Simple justice,” Kennedy said, “requires that public funds, to which all
taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.”136
Title VIII’s affirmatively furthering fair housing (AFFH) provision137
is even more explicitly directed at the administrative state—not only
purging the federal government of its past complicity in segregating and
subverting fair housing, but also placing on it the affirmative duties to
reverse course. Key proponents pushed for the provision, building on
executive orders abolishing discrimination in government run and
subsidized housing programs, because they saw Title VI (which applied to
housing programs) as insufficient in failing to place an affirmative duty on
government.138
In short, Title VI and Title VIII use administrative, programmatic, and
regulatory power to promote civil rights. Implementing these statutes,
agencies can place conditions on federal spending, issue rules and
guidance, provide technical assistance, and require reporting and selfevaluation by government grantees. As detailed in Part IV, courts also
catalyze regulatory implementation and provide a mechanism for
enforcement of regulations. But what distinguishes these statutory and
regulatory provisions from the standard models is the breadth of
administrative tools they employ to promote nondiscrimination, equity, and
inclusion. While this may be an unremarkable feature of many
administrative regimes, it has not been a part of standard American civil
rights statutes.
b.

Positive Directives

Second, these statutes require state actors to take affirmative steps to
promote equity or inclusion. Grantees must do more than refrain from
discrimination or avoid disparate impacts, as required by the central
provisions of federal fair employment and housing law. Rather, these
statutes and implementing measures are “directive” in that they require
state actors to take a series of proactive measures to achieve inclusionary
goals. Under these specific affirmative directives, state and local actors are
required to engage in front-end planning to promote equality and inclusion.

President’s News Conference of March 19, 1953, in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES: DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER 104, 108 (1953).
136 H.R. MISC. DOC. NO. 88-124, at 12 (1963).
137 See 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e) (2006) (requiring federal agencies and grantees to administer
programs “in a manner affirmatively to further the policies” of the FHA).
138 For an account, see Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 154, 193–94 (2011).

They must collect racial and ethnic data and conduct impact assessments;139
conduct outreach to minorities, limited English proficient persons, lowincome groups, and persons with disabilities;140 and propose, evaluate, and
implement more inclusive alternatives.141 In short, equality directives
require grantees to take positive steps to ensure that their funding,
programs, and policies serve to advance integration, nondiscrimination, and
inclusion.
In requiring states and localities to take the initiative to assess how
their programs might further inclusion and equality, these directives bear
some similarity to measures adopted by other countries that place positive
duties on state actors. Most prominently, in the United Kingdom, equality
law places a set of proactive duties on government to achieve equality by
having “due regard” to eliminate discrimination, promote equality of
opportunity, and further “good relations” between racial and ethnic
groups.142 From this general “due regard” duty, public authorities engage in
a set of more specific activities, including assessing the equality impact of
their activities, and considering how these impacts might be reduced.143
c.

Pervasive and Embedded

A final noteworthy aspect of equality directives is that they embed a
set of equity-promoting requirements in the daily operation of state-funded

139 See, e.g., FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at V-1 (requiring transit agencies receiving certain
federal funds to collect demographic data on the impact of their activities); OFFICE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 1 (requiring an analysis of the impact of agriculture policies on racial
and ethnic minorities and persons with disabilities).
140 See, e.g., DOT Policy Guidance Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to Limited
English Proficient (LEP) Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087 (Dec. 14, 2005) (requiring the inclusion of
LEP populations by translating relevant information and the inclusion of such LEP populations in
impact assessments); FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at IV-4 (requiring federally funded transit
agencies to develop a public participation strategy to “seek out and consider” views of lowincome, minority, and LEP populations).
141 See, e.g., FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at V-5, V-7 (requiring evaluations of the impact of
transit services, service and fare changes, and requiring the adoption of alternatives that eliminate
disparities).
142 See Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 75 (U.K.) (requiring public authorities to have
“due regard” to the need to promote equal opportunity with attention to a range of categories
including religion, race and ethnicity, gender and disability); Race Relations (Amendment) Act
2000:
Summary
of
the
2000
Act,
LEGISLATION.GOV.UK
(2000),
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/34/notes/division/3 (describing the law as placing a
duty on specified public authorities to work towards the elimination of unlawful discrimination
and promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial
groups).
143 See Race Relations: The Race Relations Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) Order 3006 (2003),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2003/3006/pdfs/uksi_20033006_en.pdf (requiring
particular government entities to assess the likely adverse racial impacts of their policies, monitor
existing policies for adverse impact and consult with affected communities).

and state-operated programs by imposing ongoing requirements of selfevaluation, monitoring, and reporting. For instance, all recipients of federal
mass transit funds must conduct impact assessments, outreach, and other
practices to include minority groups, persons with disabilities, and groups
with limited English proficiency.144 Unlike traditional antidiscrimination
requirements, these are not admonishments to avoid or remedy bias and
exclusion. Rather, they are requirements that multi-billion-dollar federal
programs continuously operate in ways that promote the robust
participation and inclusion of varied groups.
In this regard, a key strength of these programs is that the
requirements are embedded in existing grant programs. These directives
require the consideration of civil rights or equity concerns as part of the
ongoing process of receiving and spending federal funds in particular
programs. When a transit agency or locality takes federal funds, they must
assess the impacts of existing and proposed programs and policies, conduct
outreach to include groups in planning and design, and adopt practices that
promote goals of housing integration and access to transit.145 These duties
do not depend on filing an administrative or legal complaint, but rather are
triggered by the receipt of federal funds. These directives draw on the
spending and oversight relationship that exists between the federal
government and its subnational grantees. They are implemented primarily
through that regulatory architecture.
II
BEYOND ANTIDISCRIMINATION

Before providing a more detailed examination of the implementation
of these directives in housing and transportation, this Part argues that
equality directives warrant greater attention from those interested in
promoting social equality and inclusion today. Decrying the failure of civil
rights laws has become fashionable, even among those interested in
advancing their goals. Commentators argue that discrimination provides a
poor explanation for contemporary forms of inequality.146 The thin
normative goal of preventing discrimination, they argue, should shift
toward a more robust goal of promoting structural inclusion and
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See infra notes 183–188 and accompanying text (detailing regulatory requirements).
See infra Parts III.A.3, III.B.3 (detailing federal, state, and local implementation of
directives in housing and transportation).
146 See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 11–14 (2011) (arguing that antidiscrimination law is a poor tool for
promoting inclusion and equity because it detracts attention from inequities that are not caused by
overt prejudice or simple discrimination); Banks & Ford, supra note 18, at 1058–59 (noting the
limitations of explicit bias in explaining current forms of racial and ethnic inequality).
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opportunity.147 My claim is that equality directives provide an answer,
relying on existing civil rights law to promote goals that extend beyond
remedying bias.
The essential features of equality directives outlined above—that they
engage broader forms of administrative power, are positive, and are
pervasive—give thos directives a power beyond the standard
antidiscrimination model of civil rights. For instance, they engage the
power of the state at a time when the demise of formal types of state
exclusion would make it tempting to ignore the continued role of the state
in shaping inequality.148 Moreover, equality directives harness a broader set
of regulatory tools than traditional antidiscrimination law, which focuses
on courts or state adjudicatory power. Equality directives use the state’s
power to create new programs, oversee existing programs, make rules to
govern programs and spending, and centralize and dispense information
and research.
Significantly, directives do not require wholesale abandonment of
civil rights responses in favor of social welfare responses to address
societal inequality.149 They are, after all, creatures of existing civil rights
statutes. Indeed, they point to the untapped regulatory potential that
remains in these statutes. Yet equality directives demand that civil rights
proponents move away from a focus on eradicating bias in courts. In the
area of race and ethnicity, such a move is particularly crucial given that
racial inequality is sustained not just by contemporary bias, but also by a
complex interplay of historic and contemporary bias, poverty, and classrelated disadvantage.150
A.

Regulating the State Itself

I have noted that equality directives harness different aspects of state
power than the paradigmatic Title VII model, which focuses on using state
power to further prosecution and resolution of discrimination claims. Under
the typical account of Title VII, Congress prohibits discrimination and

147 See, e.g., Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in
Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 249–50 (2006) (arguing for “institutional
citizenship” rather than diversity or antidiscrimination as a framework for promoting workplace
equity).
148 See infra notes 156–160 and accompanying text (discussing the continued salience of the
state in determining equality and opportunity).
149 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 54–56 (2004)
(arguing that, while disability advocacy has recently found success through social welfare
strategies, advocates should remember their previous criticisms of the social welfare model).
150 See infra notes 159–162 and accompanying text (discussing the landscape of contemporary
inequality).

delegates enforcement to public and private actors, and federal agencies
have the power to investigate and prosecute claims. The directives on
which I focus here are centrally about the less celebrated administrative
tools of advancing civil rights—the powers of spending, rulemaking, and
oversight.
The power of this alternative civil rights framework depends on the
federal government’s capacity to leverage change through its programs.
Even at a time of greatly diminishing federal resources, such resources are
rising rather than declining in relative influence. Practically speaking,
federal spending remains crucial to the sustenance of state and local level
programs in a broad range of programmatic areas of concern to social
welfare, particularly housing, transportation, health, and education.151 In
many areas, federal spending is actually increasing as a percentage of state
spending.152 Even if federal resources are declining, they still represent
billions of dollars—a vast set of programs and amount of spending with the
power to structure equality. For instance, federal spending on transportation
stands at about ninety-one billion dollars annually, making it one of the
largest domestic discretionary spending programs.153 Simply put, even in an
era of tightening budgets, federal grant-in-aid programs remain extensive.
Thus, attaching equity rules to these programs has great potential to
promote broad standards of inclusion.
B.

An Emphasis on Structure

Equality directives also warrant greater attention from those
concerned about civil rights and equity because the state has the ongoing
power to structure a complex set of racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
arrangements. While the public and private attorney general models of civil
rights are fundamentally about enhancing the antidiscrimination apparatus,

151 See generally Johnson, supra note 138, at 161 (detailing the rise in federal spending as a
proportion of state spending); Daniel Klaff & Adam Lawton, Conditional Spending and Other
Forms of Federal Cost Sharing 32 (Harvard Law Sch. Fed. Budget Policy Seminar, Briefing
Paper
No.
18,
2008),
available
at
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/hjackson/ConditionalSpending_18(rev).pdf (providing a
graphical depiction of grants to state and local governments over time).
152 See Johnson, supra note 138, at 161, 172–79 (describing the critical role of federal
spending from the 2008 stimulus in supporting states’ housing, education, and transportation
programs).
153 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT,
FISCAL
YEAR
2013,
at
tbl.32-1,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/32_1.pdf (showing that
education, employment, and social service spending is about $127 billion). By way of context,
$706 billion is spent each year on Social Security, and $690 billion on defense (with an additional
$102 billion spent on veteran’s benefits and programs). Id.

equality directives have the power to intervene to reverse structural and
persistent forms of inequity. Here, the object of regulation is the state
itself—or the choices made by state actors about how to structure the
programs they operate and fund to better advance racial and other forms of
equality.
This argument depends on understanding the state’s continuing
contribution to inequality as well as its potential to redistribute or otherwise
advance equality. The state’s contribution might seem less important when
Title VII is the paradigmatic example. But, while some commentators
argue that changes in private-sphere behavior are most salient for
promoting equity,154 in my view we should not underemphasize the
ongoing role of the state. Otherwise, as formalized discrimination by
government actors has disappeared, the government may recede as an
important target for addressing inequality.
In fact, much evidence reveals that while the causes of continued
racial and ethnic inequality are complex, government decisions play an
ongoing role. In the housing context, residentially segregated communities
of concentrated poverty limit or deny residents access to high-quality
schooling, quality jobs, opportunity networks, and basic elements of public
safety.155 Funding and programmatic decisions made at the federal, state,
and local levels influence the cost of transportation for dependent
populations. Such decisions also structure access to jobs and other

154 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 4 (2010) (arguing for the importance of applying civil rights
norms to private behavior).
155 See Xavier de Souza Briggs, More Pluribus, Less Unum? Changing Geography of Race
and Opportunity, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN
METROPOLITAN AMERICA 29–32 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005) (detailing the geographic
concentration of school failure); James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty, The New Imperative for
Equality, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 17–20 (James H. Carr & Nandinee
K. Kutty eds., 2008) [hereinafter SEGREGATION] (delineating mechanisms by which
neighborhoods of segregation and concentrated poverty contribute to poor educational outcomes);
Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, “We’d Love to Hire Them, But . . .”: The
Meaning of Race for Employers, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 203 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E.
Peterson eds., 1991) (detailing how residence and race interact to restrict job opportunities for
African-Americans); Deborah L. McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing & Education: The
Inextricable Link, in SEGREGATION, supra, at 125–26 (explaining increased racial and economic
segregation across metropolitan regions and their effect on segregation in public schools);
Margery Austin Turner, Residential Segregation and Employment Inequality, in SEGREGATION,
supra, at 151, 170–71 (discussing residential segregation as a contributing factor to less effective
job networks for minorities). Data from the 2010 census show a modest but important decrease in
the level of Black-White segregation. See JOHN R. LOGAN & BRIAN J. STULTS, THE PERSISTENCE
OF SEGREGATION IN THE METROPOLIS: NEW FINDINGS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS 1, 4 (2011),
available at http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report2.pdf. At the same time, BlackWhite segregation levels remain “very high,” particularly in terms of African-American exposure
to Whites. Id. at 4.

opportunities.156 Decisions made on where to locate affordable housing
affect whether poor families have access to the range of education, tax,
social capital, and other benefits that accompany location in low-poverty or
majority White neighborhoods.157 These geographical decisions help
explain why racial inequality in particular has endured.158 Even macro-level
changes in determinants of racial inequality that are prompted by
seemingly race-neutral influences—such as the decline of the industrial or
blue-collar economy—have racially disparate effects, given spatial forms
of inequity.159
Public decisions also influence private forms of discrimination by
interacting with micro-level private discrimination.160 Modern-day
employment discrimination is not just individualized or firm-level racial
discrimination. It also impacts how employers perceive applicants based on
the confluence of race and the neighborhoods in which they live.161
Housing discrimination through racial steering is legitimated by the
racialized landscape of residential neighborhoods as well as the often
explicit desires of customers and realtors to avoid low-poverty, highminority neighborhoods.162 In short, ensuring that public decisions and
policies operate to promote equity can address enduring problems at the
intersection of racial, ethnic, and class inequality.
This account of why the state matters as an object of civil rights
regulation is most obviously true for race and ethnicity, where the social
science literature has documented the state’s contribution to persistent
forms of inequity in housing, transportation, and wealth. It also matters in
other areas of civil rights and equity regulation such as disability, not only

156 See, e.g., THOMAS W. SANCHEZ & MARC BRENMAN, WITH JACINTA S. MA AND RICHARD
H. STOLZ, THE RIGHT TO TRANSPORTATION: MOVING TO EQUITY 1–2, 53–57 (2007)
(introducing the importance of transportation to racial equity and detailing the contribution of
transportation to the “spatial mismatch” between where low-income, urban, often minority
households live, and where jobs are located).
157 See Carr & Kutty, supra note 155, at 23 (discussing lack of wealth, access to credit, and
other systemic disparity associated with distressed neighborhoods that impair the accumulation of
wealth).
158 See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 148–85 (1993) (describing the contribution of housing
segregation to contemporary poverty).
159 See id. at 12–13, 183–84 (describing the mutually reinforcing nature of segregation and
economic decline in inner cities).
160 For an account of the literature that supports this proposition in housing, see Johnson,
supra note 56, at 1211–14.
161 See Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 155, at 215 (documenting employer skepticism
about hiring “inner-city” workers through interviews).
162 See George C. Galster & W. Mark Keeney, Race, Residence, Discrimination, and
Economic Opportunity: Modeling the Nexus of Urban Racial Phenomena, 24 URB. AFF. Q. 87,
103 (1988) (showing how Whites avoid neighborhoods perceived as “integrated”).

because of federal government complicity, but because of the government’s
power to leverage change going forward.163
C.

Beyond Bias

Engaging the state as an equity-promoting actor goes beyond the goal
of remedying bias, and thus responds to some of the limitations of
antidiscrimination law in addressing contemporary forms of inequality. By
bias, I mean the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals.164 In
the constitutional context, commentators have long argued that
antidiscrimination law as constructed by courts has proved too focused on
questions of intent and malice.165 The doctrinal solutions proposed under
equal protection—such as requiring public actors to evaluate the extent to
which their actions promote harm and to consider less harmful
alternatives166—are precisely the goals of a regime that places positive

163 See, e.g., SANCHEZ ET AL., supra note 156, at 114, 116–18 (discussing the importance of
transportation in securing mobility for persons with disabilities and detailing principles of
transportation equity for persons with disabilities, including assuring access and inclusiveness);
see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex
and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1381 (2009) (arguing that the state should take affirmative
steps to address “intimate discrimination” in the area of disability, as well as race).
164 Bias could also be defined more broadly at the institutional level, to include the failure of
officials to remedy racial disparate impacts. For instance, Professor Glenn Loury has noted that
“race-indifference” is maintained by “a disregard for the effects of a policy choice on the welfare
of persons in different racial groups.” GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY
166 (2002). While Loury describes this phenomenon as reflecting the stigma associated with race,
one could plausibly term it a form of institutional-level “bias.” Cf. Paul Brest, The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1, 7 (1976) (arguing that intentional discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause might
also be extended to include race-dependent decisions based on “racially selective sympathy and
indifference”); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground
of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1317 (2011) (defining “bias” as
including “structural discrimination”). I am using the term more narrowly to reflect not
institutional or policy level decisions, but the type of individual level bias that Loury would call
“reward bias,” or “unequal returns to equally productive contributors.” LOURY, supra, at 160
(contrasting “reward bias” with “development bias,” defined as “unequal chances to realize one’s
productive potential”).
165 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321–22 (1987) (arguing that the Court’s focus on
conscious and intentional motivation ignores the effects of racial history on the individual and
collective unconscious); Siegel, supra note 16, at 1135 (contending that the Court’s equal
protection jurisprudence has defined discriminatory purpose in “terms that are extraordinarily
difficult to prove”).
166 See Lawrence, supra note 165, at 356 (proposing that courts “analyze governmental
behavior much like a cultural anthropologist might: by considering evidence regarding the
historical and social context in which the decision was made and effectuated”); Lenhardt, supra
note 17, at 891 (proposing that courts consider whether government action causes stigmatic harm
by “preparing what would effectively be a racial impact statement”). Of course, these approaches
differ sharply from the equality directive approach, in that they would require such analysis

duties on state actors. The disparate impact component of statutory
antidiscrimination law could be another avenue for asking these
questions.167 However, the way in which courts doctrinally construct
disparate impact law has narrowed its efficacy and scope. For instance, in
asking whether disparate impacts are justified by institutional necessity,
courts often grant much deference to institutional decisionmakers.168 Such
deference likely reflects courts’ reluctance to find public institutions liable
for decisions that reflect a set of complex tradeoffs.169 Take, for instance,
Title VI disparate impact cases, in which courts typically have been
reluctant to find transit agencies liable for funding and service decisions
that harmed minorities.170
Equality directives implement the goals of disparate impact law, but
do so affirmatively and proactively in the planning stages of
decisionmaking. They require grant recipients to conduct front-end
assessment of impacts, evaluate alternatives, and include groups not
normally at the table. This approach thus avoids the back-end problems of
court enforcement of disparate impact by incorporating an equity and
inclusionary lens before policies and programs are implemented. In
requiring upfront assessment, inclusion, and redesign, equality directives
have the features of a different strand of antidiscrimination law: the
Americans with Disabilities Act’s requirement of “reasonable

retrospectively by courts rather than prospectively and concurrently by the primary governmental
decisionmaker.
167 See Siegel, supra note 164, at 1317 (describing Title VII’s disparate impact standard as
designed in part to “challenge structural discrimination—discrimination that arises from the
interaction of workplace criteria with other race-salient social practices”).
168 See Charles F. Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the “Effects” Test for
Discrimination, 94 GEO. L.J. 267, 312 (2006) (finding few successful Title VI disparate impact
cases); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2006) (noting the difficulty of prevailing in Title VII disparate impact
cases because they require that often complex employment decisions be broken down into
discrete elements); Johnson, supra note 117, at 400–01 (arguing that Title VI’s disparate impact
test, as employed by courts, has proven ill-suited to addressing practices that cause disparate
impact through their interaction with “structural and embedded racial inequalities”); Michael
Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 734–43 (2006)
(reviewing appellate and district court decisions and finding that “[d]isparate impact claims are
more difficult to prove than standard intentional discrimination claims.”).
169 Cf. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 154, at 54 (discussing the limits of adjudication in
resolving problems that are polycentric, future-oriented, and reallocational).
170 A landmark case against the Los Angeles Transit system successfully relied on the Title VI
disparate impact standard. Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d
1041 (9th Cir. 2001); see infra note 190 and accompanying text. But other similar lawsuits were
unsuccessful. See infra note 191. However, as I note in Part III, even this unsuccessful litigation
contributed to the development of the DOT’s regulatory equality directives. See infra notes 190–
192 and accompanying text.

accommodation.”171 Yet, as shown by the specific examples presented in
Part III, equality directives do more than set up broad goals akin to
“reasonable accommodation”; they require grantees to take a set of specific
steps of self-assessment, mitigation, and inclusion to meet those goals.
In moving beyond the prohibitory focus of antidiscrimination law and
instead encouraging affirmative steps, equality directives provide a broader
normative frame for civil rights goals than is captured by remedying bias.
In this Article, I use “equality” or “equity” as a more expansive short hand
than “antidiscrimination,” to signal that these directives do not simply seek
to remedy or avoid bias, but also to share federal resources, dismantle longstanding barriers in the distribution of federal funds, promote integration,
and further inclusion in policymaking, planning, and services.172
Finally, this normative shift away from bias has instrumental benefits:
It responds to the reality that individual or firm bias is at most only one
contributor to contemporary racial inequality. Some argue that bias is no
longer pervasive and that it should be demoted as an explanation for
contemporary racial inequality.173 Even short of this claim,174 too much

171 See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)
(2006) (including in the definition of discrimination “not making reasonable accommodations to
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual”). Commentators
have argued that features of Title VII, including the requirement of remedying unjustified
disparate impacts, forbidding stereotyping, and disallowing employers to cater to employer
preferences, are similar to the ADA’s accommodation requirement. See, e.g., Samuel R.
Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil
Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 859–60, 866–67 (2003) (arguing that the normative aims of
traditional antidiscrimination law and the ADA are similar—dismantling “group-based
subordination”—and employ similar means, by prohibiting “rational discrimination”); Christine
Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 645 (2001) (arguing that
Title VII’s disparate impact test imposes requirements of accommodation and, for that reason,
antidiscrimination and accommodation are best understood as “overlapping rather than
fundamentally distinct categories”).
172 This point can be overstated. As Professor Bagenstos has noted, Title VII’s ultimate goal is
not just lifting formal bias but preventing subordination and promoting full inclusion. See
Bagenstos, supra note 171, at 859–60. Key supporters articulated the Fair Housing Act’s goals as
both promoting integration and combating bias. See, e.g., 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968)
(statement of Sen. Mondale) (stating that the goal of the FHA was to promote “an integrated
society, a stable society free of the conditions which spawn riots, free of riots themselves”).
173 See LOURY, supra note 164, at 79–84 (arguing that discrimination should be “demoted,
dislodged from its current prominent place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality in
American life”); Banks & Ford, supra note 18, at 1114 (arguing that “many decisions and
practices that adversely affect racial minorities do not fit neatly within the conventional
antidiscrimination framework”); Loury, supra note 17, at 121 (arguing that “market
discrimination is only one small part of” race disparities and that current tools for combating
market discrimination are inadequate to the task of reducing economic disparities between racial
groups).
174 For accounts of pervasive bias in both lower- and higher-wage job markets and in all levels
of housing, see generally Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in a

focus on bias and antidiscrimination risks emphasizing the problems of
those well positioned to benefit from the removal of formalized barriers to
equality, while leaving untouched the enduring and embedded problems of
poverty. Often affecting low-income persons of color, those problems
include poor access to jobs, high incarceration, and poor social capital.175
While the private and public attorney general model centers on eradicating
discrimination and bias primarily in private markets, the regulatory
directives I describe focus on the state’s contribution to building a
landscape that provides access and opportunity. For these reasons, equality
directives provide a potentially powerful mechanism for promoting
inclusion and opportunity.
III
DIRECTIVES FOR HOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION EQUITY

Believing in the capacity of equality directives requires understanding
how they have emerged and how they operate in specific contexts. In this
Part, I begin by providing an account of how these directives arose in the
areas of transportation and housing—two areas in which the directives are
more developed and which are particularly salient points of intervention for
addressing contemporary inequality. This account reveals that Title VI and
Title VIII provided the statutory framework, but the regulatory
implementation was prompted by a confluence of public and private
actions. Such actions included litigation and advocacy by civil rights
groups, trends in the use of presidential directives to spur agency action and
create policy, and Supreme Court jurisprudence weakening private
enforcement.
While my chief goal in this Part is to describe these developments,

Low-Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2009). Johnson, supra
note 56, at 1197–1200, discusses the risk of overstating this point.
175 Recent legal scholarship has begun to look closely at the structural aspects of inequality,
including the contribution of government policies, the effects of cumulative and historic
inequities on contemporary discrimination, and the institutional and inter-institutional practices
that operate to exclude or disadvantage particular groups. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 117, at
384 (encouraging legal scholarship to move beyond discussions of bias to address how “[d]ecades
of discrimination have created a social structure that shapes in distinctly racial terms” residential
segregation, access to wealth, educational resources, and social capital); R.A. Lenhardt, Race
Audits, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1527, 1540–43 (2011) (describing theoretical underpinnings of
“structuralism,” which “emphasizes the cumulative effect of institutional structures and systems
on outcomes for institutions, groups, and individuals” (citing Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern &
Jamie J. Fader, The New African American Identity, 92 J. AM. HIST. 75, 75–76 (2005)); Susan
Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 458, 470–71 (2001) (showing how “ongoing patterns of interaction shaped by
organizational culture . . . influence workplace conditions, access, and opportunities for
advancement over time”).

understanding this history is central to the normative arguments that I
develop in Part IV. As I explained earlier, civil rights commentators and
advocates have proved deeply skeptical about administrative agency
capacity and have celebrated instead the power of private enforcement.176
The case studies I describe in this Part should give commentators and
advocates reason to place faith in a regulatory approach as well, because
private group advocacy pressure has already contributed to the
development of equality directives and will remain key to their efficacy. In
addition, a key feature of equality directives is an emphasis on regulatory
rather than adjudicative power.177 These case studies are intended to
amplify this point. They show how equality directives are in fact
implemented at the state and local levels, even in the absence of
enforcement action or litigation.
A.
1.

Transportation Impact Assessments

Overview

Transportation policy raises enduring questions of inclusion and
equality. Decisions on the location, physical accessibility, languages, and
cost of public transit all determine how individuals and communities will
be connected to opportunity-enhancing resources such as employment,
schools, social services, and parks. Such decisions therefore have vast
consequences for the economic development of communities, the
environment, and human health. Mobility through public transit serves to
promote independence and access to resources for persons with
disabilities.178 For minorities, the distribution and accessibility of
transportation resources contributes to poverty and joblessness. For
instance, high-minority, poor communities are often disconnected from
emerging job centers.179 In addition, transportation policies have had
profound influence in shaping segregation in metropolitan areas—

176 See supra notes 107–110 and accompanying text (detailing civil rights advocates’ and
commentators’ skepticism of administrative enforcement).
177 See supra notes 138–145 and accompanying text (arguing that equality directives harness a
broad set of state powers).
178 See SANCHEZ ET AL., supra note 156, at 113–14 (framing transportation accessibility as a
civil right).
179 See Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: What Has the Evidence Shown?, 28
URB. STUD. 105, 109–11, 118 (1991) (reviewing literature that finds gaps between the location of
jobs and where Blacks reside, but also noting contradictory evidence on whether this spatial
mismatch accounts for racial economic disparities); Thomas W. Sanchez, The Impact of Public
Transportation on U.S. Metropolitan Wage Inequality, 39 URB. STUD. 423, 434 (2002)
(documenting links between the availability of public transportation and wage inequality in large
metropolitan areas, since Blacks in particular live farther on average from employment centers).

encouraging White flight from central cities and contributing to
concentrated, racialized poverty in urban areas.180
The DOT’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) provides billions of
dollars in formula and discretionary funds for buses, subways, railways,
and other mass transit systems. Administered by the FTA, this money is
used to build, modernize, and extend transit systems, as well as to subsidize
transit fares.181 In recent years, the FTA has begun issuing equality
directives.182 FTA regulations and guidance now require grant recipients to
assess how their programs and activities impact minority communities and
to take steps to avert adverse impacts. Specifically, funding recipients must
integrate into their programs an environmental justice analysis of (1)
whether their programs and activities have adverse health and
environmental impacts on minority communities, (2) comparisons between
effects on minority communities and nonminority communities, and (3)
documentation of actions taken to mitigate those concerns.183 FTA grant
recipients must also conduct community outreach to ensure participation of
minority and LEP communities.184 For mass-transit programs and activities
in larger regions, DOT requires funding recipients to gather and analyze
data to evaluate whether minority groups are benefiting fairly from
federally funded programs and services;185 develop quantitative measures to

180 See KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES (1985) (detailing the contribution of highway development to suburbanization,
sprawl, and segregation).
181 See FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., HIGHLIGHTS OF THE FEDERAL
TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION’S IMPACT ON PUBLIC TRANSIT IN THE UNITED STATES 1–5, available
at http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FtaImpactBook_Web.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2012)
(describing the role and accomplishments of the FTA).
182 The Federal Highway Administration—which administers an even larger store of funds for
surface transit—has similar directives. See FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NO.
6640.23A, FHWA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN MINORITY POPULATIONS
AND
LOW-INCOME
POPULATIONS
(June
14,
2012),
available
at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/directives/orders/664023a.htm (establishing policies and
procedures for the Federal Highway Administration’s compliance with Executive Order 12,898,
59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994)); Community Impact Assessment: A Quick Reference for
Transportation, FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. (Sept. 1996),
http://www.ciatrans.net/CIA_Quick_Reference/Purpose.html (integrating federal statutes and
regulations, including those related to environmental justice and nondiscrimination, to require
grantees to assess transportation projects for their impact on a community and its quality of life).
183 For FTA construction projects covered by the National Environmental Policy Act,
recipients should complete an environmental justice analysis. See FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1,
at IV-4.
184 See id. (“[Grantees] should seek out and consider the viewpoints of minority, low-income,
and LEP populations . . . . An agency’s public participation strategy shall offer early and
continuous opportunities for the public to be involved in the identification of social, economic,
and environmental impacts of proposed transportation decisions.”).
185 See id. at V-1 (including a “Requirement to Collect Demographic Data”). DOT suggests a

evaluate whether services are being provided in similar ways to different
racial and ethnic groups;186 evaluate significant system-wide service and
fare changes to determine whether they have a discriminatory impact;187
monitor services every three years to ensure that prior decisions have not
resulted in disparate impact; and “take corrective action to remedy [any]
disparities.”188 While “informal,” this guidance is an implementation of
DOT’s Title VI regulations, and there are possible sanctions for failures to
comply.189
In effect, these requirements transform Title VI’s statutory prohibition
on “discrimination” into a set of affirmative requirements: to conduct an
equity analysis that analyzes impacts and considers alternatives, and to
promote full participation.
2.

Emergence

These directives did not emerge from a single government
pronouncement. Rather, they emerged over a number of years, from a set of
regulatory actions and from private group litigation and advocacy.
First, these regulations were made possible by Title VI litigation and
complaints brought in the mid-1990s against transit departments before
Sandoval, most prominently Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, which successfully
sought redress for claims that the transit system’s funding and policies
disfavored predominantly minority bus riders.190 Aside from the Los
Angeles case, much of this litigation was unsuccessful.191 However, these

number of options for satisfying this requirement, including geographic information system
mapping, survey information collection, or a locally developed alternative that meets the
regulatory obligations of 49 C.F.R. § 21.9(b) (2011). See FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at V-1 to
V-3.
186 See FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at V-3 (including a “Requirement to Set Systemwide
Service Standards”). The circular goes on to recommend system-wide standards such as the
system’s on-time performance, frequency of service, distribution of comfort and amenities (such
as benches, shelters, and route maps), and service availability. FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at
V-3 to V-4.
187 See id. at V-5 to V-7 (“Requirement to Evaluate Service and Fare Changes”).
188 Id. at V-7.
189 See id. at VIII-2 to VIII-3 (authorizing DOT to suspend, terminate, refuse to grant, or
continue federal financial assistance to grantees who are out of compliance).
190 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001). In the case, minority bus riders brought a claim that the
transit authority was expanding rail services while disfavoring funding for buses primarily ridden
by minorities, resulting in intentional and disparate impact discrimination in violation of Title VI
and its regulations. The suit resulted in an eventual consent decree against the transit authority. Id.
As a student intern at the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, I assisted in this litigation in
its initial stages.
191 See, e.g., N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995) (vacating a
district court order enjoining the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority from raising fares

demands for the full inclusion of racial and ethnic minorities in the
planning and the distribution of transit resources framed transportation
equity as a Title VI concern.192
Second, executive orders promulgated in the late 1990s enabled these
directives by requiring that federal programs integrate goals related to
environmental justice and improve access for communities with limited
English proficiency. Since 1972, grantees under key DOT programs have
had a duty to certify that they are complying with Title VI’s
antidiscrimination and disparate impact regulations.193 These rules include
the standard disparate impact provision, which prohibits recipients from
“utilizing criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting people to discrimination on the basis of their race, color, or
national origin.”194 They also require recipients “even in the absence of
prior discriminatory practice or usage” to “take affirmative action to assure
that no person is excluded from participation nor denied the benefits” of
programs based on race or ethnicity.195
The 2007 revision of the DOT guidelines aims to provide clearer
guidance and procedures on the meaning of disparate impact.196 It
implements two executive orders. The first was a 1994 Clinton
Administration Executive Order directing all federal agencies to integrate
environmental justice concerns into federal programs by evaluating the
environmental and human health effects of their programs and policies on

twenty percent for urban transit while only raising them nine percent for commuter rail service);
Comm. for a Better N. Phila. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 935 F.3d. 1280 (3d Cir. 1991) (rejecting
plaintiffs’ claim that the allocation of federal subsidies for the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transit
Authority (SEPTA)’s commuter rail division at the expense of SEPTA’s city transit division had
a disparate impact on minorities in violation of Title VI).
192 In adopting equality directives, DOT specifically referenced these Title VI complaints and
presented the guidance, in part as a response to a set of systemic complaints filed against transit
systems. See Notice of Proposed Title VI Circular, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,178, 40,180 (July 14, 2006)
(providing examples of Title VI litigation and administrative complaints).
193 See generally 49 C.F.R. § 21 (2012) (DOT’s regulations implementing Title VI). Grant
recipients must certify annually to the FTA that they are complying with Title VI. Id. § 21.9(b);
FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at IV-1. Every three years, grant recipients must complete a more
extensive written submission documenting their compliance with Title VI, including summaries
of public outreach and involvement; written plans for inclusion of people with limited English
proficiency; a record of Title VI complaints; investigations and lawsuits; and a documentation of
their procedures for tracking and investigating Title VI complaints. Id. at IV-3.
194 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2).
195 Id.
196 See Notice of Proposed Title VI Circular, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,178, 40,179 (stating that the rule
revisions were prompted by a desire to provide grantees greater specificity on the “types of
actions” that meet the 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(7) requirement that grantees take affirmative steps to
promote inclusion).

minority and low-income communities.197 In addition to affirming existing
prohibitions on discriminatory actions and those with unjustified
discriminatory effects,198 the Executive Order requires each agency to
develop an environmental justice strategy identifying environmental
effects,199 gather and disseminate specific data,200 and promote public
participation in decisionmaking and research.201
DOT’s equality directives also arise from a second executive order,
issued by the Clinton Administration in 2000 and implemented by federal
agencies under George W. Bush. The second Order requires federal
agencies to take affirmative steps to provide “meaningful access” to
persons with limited English proficiency (LEP).202 As the Order makes
clear, the “meaningful access” requirement had long been part of Title VI’s
regulations,203 but the Order requires agencies to develop more specific
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See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
See id. at 7630 (prohibiting federal agencies, whose programs and activities affect human
health and the environment, from discriminating or excluding individuals based on race, color, or
national origin).
199 The environmental justice strategy must identify “programs, policies, planning and public
participation processes, enforcement, and/or rulemakings related to human health or the
environment.” Id.
200 The Order requires that agencies conducting environmental health research analyze
activities that significantly impact minority, low-income persons, and other at-risk populations.
Id. at 7631. All agencies should regularly collect and analyze information regarding whether their
programs, policies, or activities have a disproportionate effect on minority and low-income
populations. Id.
201 The Executive Order directs agencies to promote public participation in decisionmaking
related to the environment by requiring public hearings and notice, as well as by ensuring that
documents are understandable to the general public and translated for LEP populations. Id. at
7632; see also Memorandum from William Clinton, President, for the Heads of All Departments
and
Agencies
(Feb.
11,
1994)
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources/policy/clinton_memo_12898.pdf.
202 Exec. Order No. 13,166, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,121 (Aug. 16, 2000); see also Notice of Proposed
Title VI Circular, 71 Fed. Reg. 40,178 (July 14, 2006) (notice of revision of Title VI guidance for
urban mass transit agencies).
203 See DOJ Policy Guidance, Enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—
National Origin Discrimination Against Persons with Limited English Proficiency, 65 Fed. Reg.
50,123 (Aug. 16, 2000) (“This policy guidance does not create new obligations, but rather,
clarifies existing Title VI responsibilities.”). The DOJ issued a policy guidance for Clinton’s
Executive Order, and the DOJ’s role in coordinating and implementing the Order continued
during the Bush Administration with a set of regulatory guidances on the inclusion of LEP
communities. See DOT Policy Guidance Concerning Recipients’ Responsibilities to Limited
English Proficient (LEP) Persons, 70 Fed. Reg. 74,087 (Dec. 14, 2005) (providing LEP guidance
for recipients of DOT’s federal financial assistance); see also FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at
IV-1 to IV-2 (providing LEP guidance for Urban Mass Transit Programs receiving federal
financial assistance); Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies, General Counsels and
Civil
Rights
Directors
(Oct.
26,
2001),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/lep/Oct26memorandum.pdf (clarifying for agencies the
198

rules and guidelines to ensure that funding recipients and federal agencies
meet this requirement.204
The final factor in the creation of equality directives in transportation
was Sandoval itself, which ended private enforcement of Title VI’s
disparate impact regulations and created the possibility of additional
administrative complaints against grant recipients. In its 2007 guidance
requiring impact assessments and greater inclusion of minorities and other
disadvantaged groups, the agency noted that Sandoval was likely to lead to
an increase in administrative complaints against the DOT; thus, revision of
the guidance would assist grantees in preventing disparate impacts.205
3.

Implementation

These transit directives are becoming embedded in federal, state, and
local programs, spurring recipients to incorporate equality and inclusionary
goals at the front-end planning stages. The FTA now implements its
equality directives by requiring grantees to conduct impact assessments,
outreach, and mitigation;206 providing technical assistance on how to
conduct impact assessments;207 supplying information on best practices for
ensuring outreach and public participation;208 and withholding federal funds
pending compliance with impact assessments and other measures.209 To

requirements for implementing the LEP Executive Order).
204 See DOJ Policy Guidance, 65 Fed. Reg. 50,123 (requiring agencies to draft LEP guidance
and to develop an implementation plan). The DOT also incorporated its goals for the inclusion of
LEP populations in the 2000 circular’s requirement that recipients translate relevant information
for LEP populations and include such communities in impact assessments and community
outreach. See DOT Policy Guidance, 70 Fed. Reg. at 74,088 (implementing LEP guidance for
DOT financial assistance recipients).
205 See Notice of Proposed Title VI Circular, 71 Fed. Reg. at 40,179 (noting that Sandoval
would likely lead to an increase in disparate impact complaints and thus that “recipients of FTA
funds and the general public would benefit from guidance clarifying what steps they should take
to demonstrate that their programs, policies, and activities do not result in a disparate impact on
the basis of race, color, or national origin”).
206 See Letter from Peter Rogoff, Fed. Transit Admin., to Grantees (Mar. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.fta.dot.gov/newsroom/12910_12480.html (reminding grantees of the importance of
complying with Title VI and FTA’s implementing guidance).
207 See Fed. Transit Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Transit Service and Fare Equity Analysis
Webinar (Aug. 18, 2010) (webinar announcement on file with the New York University Law
Review) (explaining how to perform fare analysis and which kinds of changes warrant such
analysis).
208 See, e.g., NAT’L COOP. HIGHWAY RESEARCH PROGRAM, RESEARCH RESULTS DIGEST 340:
STATE DOT BEST PRACTICES FOR TITLE VI COMPLIANCE 10–11 (Dec. 2009), available at
http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/nchrp/nchrp_rrd_340.pdf (providing examples from the field
on effective outreach, decisionmaking, and inclusion of the public in planning).
209 See S. MYERS, LEE CNTY. TRANSIT DEP’T, TITLE VI PLAN: 2009 PROGRAM UPDATE 7
(2009), available at http://www.rideleetran.com/pdfs/2009 LeeTran Title VI Plan.pdf (explaining
that the FTA required improvement in state and local transit authorities’ compliance with Title

comply with DOT’s equality directives, state and local transit agencies
must collect demographic data; conduct outreach to include minorities,
LEP communities, and persons with disabilities; incorporate equity
assessments of service, fare, and other changes into their transit decisions;
and adopt measures to mitigate harm to minority and transit-dependent
populations.210
Equality directives also prompt transit agencies to include equity
concerns in the upfront design of their transit system. For example, while
enforcing equality directives, Chicago researchers, community groups, and
the public transit authority collaborated to design transit system extensions
that more effectively meet the needs of minority, transit-dependent, and
low-income populations.211 The Minneapolis transit agency also included
an equity analysis in the initial design of a new light rail system, structuring
the proposed routes to enhance benefits and avoid harm to minority
communities.212
In addition, equality directives have led agencies to mitigate harm to
minority groups when making transit reductions.213 The Washington

VI); SE. REG’L PLANNING & ECON. DEV. DIST., SRTA FIXED ROUTE SYSTEM FARE STUDY FOR
THE CITIES OF FALL RIVER AND NEW BEDFORD 2
(2008), available at
http://www.srpedd.org/transportation/SRTA Route Survey - AUGUST 2008.pdf (including a fare
equity study conducted in response to a letter from the FTA’s Office of Civil Rights).
210 See Larry W. Thomas, Reductions in Transit Service or Increases in Fares: Civil Rights,
ADA, Regulatory, and Environmental Justice Implications, 35 L. RES. DIG., Mar. 2011, at 3
(reporting a survey describing the integration of impact assessments, with relation to service cuts
and fare increases); Transit Coop. Research Program, Transit Agency Compliance with Title VI:
Limited English Proficiency Requirements, 97 RES. RESULTS DIG., Jan. 2011, at 1 (describing the
integration of LEP-focused requirements).
211 See NATHALIE P. VOORHEES CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD & CMTY. IMPROVEMENT, UNIV.
OF ILL. AT CHI., TRANSIT EQUITY MATTERS: AN EQUITY INDEX AND REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF
THE RED LINE AND TWO OTHER PROPOSED CTA TRANSIT EXTENSIONS 16–17 (2009), available
at http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/voorheesctr/Publications/Transit Equity Matters 12.09.pdf (building
on FTA’s Title VI and environmental justice guidance to develop an “equity index”—consisting
of indicators of the extent to which transit enhances mobility, economic and housing
development, and environmental and human health).
212 See CENTRAL CORRIDOR LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT PROJECT, CENTRAL CORRIDOR TITLE VI
ANALYSIS:
APPENDIX
I
(2009),
available
at
http://www.metrocouncil.org/transportation/ccorridor/FEIS/AppendixI.pdf (documenting Title VI
concerns raised by Minneapolis community groups and mitigation efforts taken by the transit
authority); Dist. Councils Collaborative of St. Paul and Minneapolis, Stops For Us, DISTRICT
COUNCILS COLLABORATIVE, http://dcc-stpaul-mpls.org/special-projects/stops-us (last visited
Aug. 18, 2012) (describing community groups’ use of public input and the Title VI complaint
process to ensure that the federally-funded light rail initiative included stops in low-income and
minority areas); see also Public Influence on the Central Corridor Project, METROPOLITAN
COUNCIL
(Oct.
19,
2011),
http://www.metrocouncil.org/transportation/ccorridor/PublicInfluence.htm (describing public
input, additional stations, and other changes made to provide better access for disability groups).
213 See SE. REG’L PLANNING AND ECON. DEV. DIST., supra note 209, at 8 (recommending

Metropolitan Area Transit Authority recently conducted a fare and service
analysis when budget shortfalls forced increases in fares and changes in
service. After holding public hearings and extending outreach and language
assistance to LEP populations, the transit system increased fares but
structured them to mitigate harms to transit-dependent minority and lowincome riders.214 Similarly, the New Jersey Transit Authority—under
pressure from local advocates to reveal their impact assessments—adopted
a plan to minimize the effects of fare increases on minority, low-income,
and transit-dependent populations.215
As discussed in Part IV, governments and civil society groups can do
more to strengthen implementation.216 Yet this account of federal oversight
of transit agencies and integration of the directives by transit agencies
shows the promise of this new regime.
B.
1.

Furthering Housing Integration

Overview

Fair housing provides my second example of equality directives. As
noted above, housing segregation and the location of affordable housing are
key determinants of social mobility and access to opportunity.217 As I have
argued elsewhere, dismantling spatial segregation requires the federal
government to do more than advance nondiscrimination and reduce private

alternatives to mitigate the potential harm of fare and service changes); see also MYERS, supra
note 209, at 10–13 (detailing analyses of service and fare changes and of the distribution of transit
services and amenities); MADISON CNTY. COUNCIL OF GOV’TS, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION PLAN
FOR THE ANDERSON/MADISON COUNTY METROPOLITAN PLANNING AREA (2007), available at
http://www.mccog.net/pdf/mccog_public_participation_policy.pdf (describing public outreach
strategies and designs in response to the FTA’s guidance); Robert L. Hickey et al., Using
Quantitative Methods in Equity and Demographic Analysis to Inform Transit Fare Restructuring
Decisions, 2144 TRANSP. RES. REC.: J. TRANSP. RES. BOARD 80 (2010) (describing a fare equity
analysis conducted by New York City’s transit system); Commission Meeting Minutes, DES
MOINES TRANSIT AUTH. (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.ridedart.com/4 - Minutes 3-29-11.pdf
(detailing outreach to the LEP community and proposed fare and equity analysis).
214 See WASH. METRO. AREA TRANSIT AUTH., TITLE VI EQUITY EVALUATION: PROPOSED
ADJUSTMENTS TO PASSENGER FARES, ROUTES, HOURS OF SERVICE, AND OTHER CHANGES 3–5
(2010),
available
at
http://www.wmata.com/about_metro/docs/Title_VI_Equity
_Evaluation_of_FY2011_Budget.pdf (summarizing the potential impact to particular populations
and actions taken to mitigate any harm).
215 Kyle Wiswall, NJ Transit Releases Equity Analysis in Nick of Time, Admits Some Impacts,
MOBILIZING REGION (Apr. 23, 2010), http://blog.tstc.org/2010/04/23/nj-transit-releases-equityanalysis-in-nick-of-time-admits-some-impacts.
216 See infra Part IV (providing recommendations for improving efficacy of equality
directives).
217 See supra notes 155–159 and accompanying text (detailing the consequences of spatial
segregation).

market bias—it also requires the government to use its regulatory and
programmatic power to promote integrated affordable housing
opportunities.218
Equality directives in housing aim to use federal power to promote
these goals of nondiscrimination and integration. State and local
governments that receive federal community development funds must
evaluate public and private obstacles to achieving fair housing in their
communities and take steps to reduce those obstacles. These regulatory
requirements, adopted in 1995, are known as the “analysis of
impediments.” They apply to Community Development Block Grants, one
of the largest sources of federal funding for the revitalization of lowincome communities.219 A HUD manual implementing these regulations
provides guidance on the range of ways that grantees can meet these
obligations, specifying both how to collect and analyze data and how to
structure programs to better promote integration and nondiscrimination.220
These regulations and informal guidance proved central in a recent case
holding Westchester County liable for failing to comply with its statutory
duty to affirmatively further fair housing under Title VIII.221
2.

Emergence

The statutory backdrop here is Title VIII’s requirement that federal
agencies and federal grantees “affirmatively further” fair housing.222 This
provision responds to past federal complicity in creating segregation;
evidence shows that key drafters of the provision sought greater
engagement by federal actors to combat private market discrimination and
to use federal programs to promote integration.223 Yet the federal
government did little to enforce the provision until spurred by litigation in
the 1970s. At that time, advocates relied on the provision to challenge

218 See Johnson, supra note 56, at 1212–14 (showing how federal, state, and local
governments contribute to residential segregation and urging involvement of government actors
in promoting integration opportunities).
219 The Housing Community Development Act of 1974 requires grantees to certify that they
are in compliance with the Fair Housing Act and that they will affirmatively further fair housing.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5304(b)(2), 5306(d)(5) (2006). HUD regulations again require this
certification—and more specifically require that grantees conduct a fair housing analysis. See 24
C.F.R. § 570.601(a)(2) (2012).
220 FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2.
221 U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 561–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
222 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (2006).
223 See Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional
Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 333, 389 (2007) (providing the legislative history of the provision).

HUD’s past history of creating racial segregation in public housing, as well
as ongoing siting practices by HUD and local grantees that operated to
further racial segregation. The result was a set of important lower court
cases holding that HUD’s duty to further fair housing required HUD to
promote integration in locating public and subsidized housing.224 HUD
complied by promulgating its first set of regulations on racialized site
selection, which prohibited federally funded projects from furthering
segregation (or “minority concentration”) unless necessary to meet an
“overriding need” for housing in the target community.225
More than twenty years later, the Clinton Administration issued an
order giving further life to the statutory directive. The 1994 Executive
Order directs federal agencies to further fair housing in the design of their
policies and the administration of their programs.226 More specifically, one
order directs HUD to require grantees to analyze “impediments” to fair
housing.227 HUD now requires that communities seeking to receive grants

224 See, e.g., Shannon v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 436 F.2d 809, 816, 821–22 (3d
Cir. 1970) (holding that the Fair Housing Act and Title VI require HUD to affirmatively further
fair housing by considering the racial and socioeconomic effects of its site selection decisions);
NAACP, Bos. Chapter v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987)
(finding the Fair Housing Act to require that HUD “use its grant programs to assist in ending
discrimination and segregation, to the point where the supply of genuinely open housing
increases.”).
225 Subpart N—Project Selection Criteria, 37 Fed. Reg. 203–04 (1972) (formerly codified at
24 C.F.R. pt. 200) (rescinded by Elimination of Obsolete Parts, 60 Fed. Reg. 47,260–61 (Sept. 11,
1995)). Prior to Shannon, HUD had begun an effort to establish site selection criteria. See Steven
Lev, HUD Site and Neighborhood Selection Standards: An Easing for Placement Restrictions, 22
URB. L. ANN. 199, 207 (1981) (describing efforts undertaken by Secretary George Romney in the
Nixon Administration). The Third Circuit’s actions in Shannon in a sense catalyzed this action.
See BONASTIA, supra note 110, at 128 (providing an account of the effect of the decision on HUD
policy).
226 The order required agencies to promote fair housing in the design and operation of their
programs, to publish regulations to implement fair housing directives, and to establish a process
for promoting compliance, including procedures for investigation, informal resolution, and
sanctions. See Exec. Order No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 17, 1994) (implementing
requirements to affirmatively futher fair housing by executive departments and federal agencies).
227 Id. at 2941. The Order requires that HUD “describe a method to identify impediments in
programs or activities that restrict fair housing choice and implement incentives that will
maximize the achievement of practices that affirmatively further fair housing.” Id. The Analysis
of Impediments (AI) directive also stems from legislation requiring community development
grantees to further fair housing. Specifically, in 1983, Congress required that all grantees
receiving community development block grant funds certify that they would affirmatively further
fair housing. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (codified as amended in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.). Congress required
certification in another HUD affordable housing program in 1990. See Cranston-Gonzalez
National Affordable Housing Act of 1990 (NAHA), 42 U.S.C. § 12705(b)(15)–(16) (2006)
(requiring certification); id. § 12704(21) (defining certification).

under major housing affordability and community development programs228
submit an AFFH certification,229 analyze “impediments to fair housing
choice within the jurisdiction,” “take appropriate actions to overcome the
effects of any impediments identified through that analysis,” and “maintain
[relevant] records.”230
3.

Implementation

As in the area of transportation, federal, state, and local actors are
taking steps to implement the fair housing equality directive. At the federal
level, HUD implements the directive by providing guidance on how
communities can proactively promote fair housing. HUD’s Fair Housing
Planning Guide requires that entities, when conducting their analysis of
impediments, assess how relevant laws and policies affect the availability,
location, and accessibility of housing and review all conditions affecting
fair housing choice on the basis of race, ethnicity, disability, and other
categories.231 The Planning Guide requires that jurisdictions take a regional
approach to fair housing planning (which is intended to further integration
within metropolitan areas), establish procedures for public input, and
conduct effective data analysis.232 The Planning Guide then requires
jurisdictions to take actions to address these impediments, though, as I
discuss in greater detail below, the Planning Guide’s language could be
more directive on the details of the specific actions that must be taken.233
The Planning Guide also provides examples of best practices and
model interventions to address impediments to fair housing, including
creating local fair housing commissions,234 enacting legislation mandating

228 In 1995, HUD consolidated the Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG)
with other housing affordability and community development programs, requiring specifically
that communities submit what is known as the Consolidated Plan. Consolidated Submission for
Community Planning and Development Programs, 60 Fed. Reg. 1896, 1897 (Jan. 5, 1995)
(codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 91, § 91.2 (2012)).
229 Certification requires a written assertion, “[b]ased on supporting evidence,” “[a]vailable for
inspection” by HUD, the Inspector General, and the public, and “[d]eemed accurate” unless the
Secretary determines otherwise. FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2, at 1-4.
230 24 C.F.R. § 91.225(a)(1) (2012).
231 FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2, at 4-4. “Impediments” to fair housing
choice include not just violations of the Fair Housing Act, but also actions or omissions that have
the effect of restricting housing opportunities on the basis of race, disability, and other areas, and
that are “counterproductive to fair housing choice such as” “[c]ommunity resistance” to
“minorities, persons with disabilities” and others. Id. at 2-17.
232 Id. at 2-9, 2-11, 3-27.
233 See infra text accompanying notes 261–262 (discussing areas where the Fair Housing
Planning Guide leaves much discretion to grantees).
234 FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2, at 3-13.

pro-integrative site selection for affordable housing in localities,235
increasing funding for local fair housing and human rights agencies,236
adopting laws prohibiting source of income discrimination,237 creating
housing accessibility and inclusionary zoning ordinances,238 working with
local groups to establish fair housing testing programs,239 and providing
mobility assistance for housing voucher recipients.240
HUD’s most recent guidance to grantees expands on the Planning
Guide by requiring grant recipients to adopt a comprehensive regional
approach to dismantling racial and economic segregation and to promoting
housing integration.241 Research and practice show that the problem of
racialized concentration of poverty requires solutions at the regional level.
Segregation is manifest not only in terms of racial and economic
differences between neighborhoods, but also in the spatial divide between
suburbs and cities.242 Indeed, political and geographical boundaries are
often shaped and defined by economic and racial segregation.243 In that
vein, HUD requires federal grantees to work not just within geographically
defined barriers but also in conjunction with other localities to remove
barriers to segregation. Specifically, grantees must conduct a regional
equity assessment to identify areas of racial and ethnic segregation and
racially concentrated areas of poverty;244 understand the demographic
trends and the forces driving segregation; identify disparities in access to
opportunities such as quality schools, jobs, and stable housing;245 and take
steps at the regional level to address segregation and disparities in
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Id. at 3-14.
Id.
237 Id. at 4-9.
238 Id.
239 Id. at 4-11.
240 Id.
241 U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ADDRESSING EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY: THE
REGIONAL FAIR HOUSING AND EQUITY ASSESSMENT (FHEA) GRANT OBLIGATION (2011),
available at http://www.prrac.org/pdf/Regional_FH_Equity_Assessment_HUD_Aug_2011.pdf
[hereinafter ADDRESSING EQUITY]. This regional approach is consistent with the overall goals of
the FHA.
242 See Briggs, supra note 155, at 18, 23.
243 See id. at 23; Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1844 (1994) (introducing the argument that political
and jurisdictional boundaries can promote racially unequal distributions of political and economic
resources).
244 ADDRESSING EQUITY, supra note 241, at 7. “Racially Concentrated Areas of Poverty” are
defined as census tracks that are a majority non-White and have family poverty rates of more than
forty percent. Id. at 14.
245 Id. at 18. HUD has created five indices for identifying access to opportunity: “School
Proficiency Index, Poverty Index, Labor Market Index, Housing Stability Index, [and] Job Access
Index.” Id. at 19.
236

opportunity.246
Notably, this recent guidance articulates goals beyond
antidiscrimination, specifying that grantees “do more than just combat
discrimination”; they must work towards equity and opportunity.247 The
aim is to create “geographies of opportunity”: locations that “effectively
connect people to jobs, quality public schools,” and other resources
necessary for social and economic advancement.248 This guidance
illustrates the approach of equality directives by providing a location for
proactive planning and policymaking towards goals of substantive
inclusion and equality.
At the state and local levels, grantees are beginning to engage in
programs and policies to affirmatively further fair housing goals. The HUD
Fair Housing Planning Guide provides examples of specific states,
including Montana, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Indiana, that have used the
analysis of impediments and affirmatively furthering directives to engage
in fair housing planning, identify key obstacles to fair housing, and map
responsive solutions.249 Planning professionals and community members
have lauded localities in Illinois, Tennessee, Ohio, and Nevada for
developing robust analyses of impediments in recent years.250
Massachusetts has built on HUD’s equality directives to undertake in
vigorous fair housing planning and programming. For instance, the state
gives priority funding to projects and communities that meet certain fair
housing criteria. Those criteria include: creating affordable racially and
ethnically inclusive housing; accommodating persons with disabilities; and
using federal funds to provide housing search assistance to help link
families receiving vouchers to housing opportunities in low-poverty,
integrated neighborhoods.251 The state has also required localities seeking
federal housing funding to develop an affirmative fair housing program
with particular elements, including strengthening the fair housing
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Id.
Id. at 6.
248 Id. at 3.
249 FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2, app. C.
250 See Michael Allen, No Certification, No Money: The Revival of Civil Rights Obligations in
HUD Funding Programs, 78 PLAN. COMMISSIONERS J. 16, 17 (2010) (citing as exemplary the
Naperville, Illinois analysis of impediments); see also Daniel Lauber, Analyses of Impediments to
Fair Housing Choice, PLAN./COMM., http://www.planningcommunications.com (follow
“Analyses of Impediments to Fair Housing” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 18, 2012) (describing a
planning consultant’s examples of analyses of impediments he helped produce in Naperville,
Illinois and in localities in Tennessee, Ohio, and Nevada).
251 See MASS. DEP’T OF HOUS. & CMTY. DEV., AFFIRMATIVE FAIR HOUSING AND CIVIL
RIGHTS
POLICY
22,
24–25
(2010),
available
at
http://www.mass.gov/hed/docs/dhcd/hd/fair/affirmativefairhousingp.pdf (detailing civil rights
initiatives and specifying programs and policies required of localities).
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compliance infrastructure; developing site selection and land use policies
that promote affordable housing; conducting outreach to underrepresented
groups; eliminating local residency preferences; and reforming
exclusionary zoning practices.252
In short, the fair housing equality directives require states and
localities receiving community development funds to further fair housing
by identifying public and private barriers to achieving fair housing and by
using their leverage and expertise to overcome those barriers. This leverage
includes the government’s control over programs, funding, and legislation;
its ability to gather and analyze data; its role as a convener; and its potential
access to funding and other resources. Under this model, fair housing
becomes a pervasive goal of government-funded community development
programs.
IV
TAKING EQUALITY DIRECTIVES SERIOUSLY

Thus far, I have argued that the existence of American equality
directives should prompt academic commentators to rethink the
fundamental structure of American civil rights regulation. Civil rights law
depends not only on adjudicatory power, but also on regulatory and
programmatic power. In bringing attention to these directives, I hope to
reshape civil rights commentary now dominated by accounts of court
decisions. I hope to make equality directives more central to the study and
teaching of civil rights law.
I have argued above that my account has implications not just for
scholars but also for the real-world practice of antidiscrimination and
equity. In this final Part, I direct my arguments to those who might
implement these equality directives. The case studies on housing and
transportation reveal an emerging effort to develop and implement equality
directives. They suggest a basis for faith in a regulatory approach, despite
the real constraints of administrative agencies.
In this Part, I show what government actors and private groups might
do to strengthen the equality directive regime. I am not arguing that these
models should supplant existing antidiscrimination law, nor do I want to
suggest that equality directives are a solution to all existing
antidiscrimination and inequity problems. I contend only that much more
can be done to harness their capacity. Implementation of these directives
will require government oversight and creative and persistent advocacy by
private groups, including litigation and policy advocacy.
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See id. at 24.

I begin this Part with ways to strengthen equality directives
themselves, balancing their emphasis on flexibility and process-based
solutions with the need to ensure that these equality directives achieve
results. I then turn to strengthening the role of government actors in
overseeing and implementing these directives, a crucial part of which
depends on prodding by private actors. Finally, I turn to how private groups
can strengthen and expand emerging implementation efforts, relying on
traditional forms of administrative and court enforcement where possible—
but also, crucially, non-litigation forms of advocacy and implementation.
My faith in the approach ultimately depends on private group engagement
with the directives: Civil rights groups, community organizers, and policy
advocates can help spur implementation, enhance the capacity of equality
directives, and thereby help transform civil rights practice to better promote
equity and social inclusion.
A.

Strengthening Directives

A key strength of equality directives is that they emphasize regulatory
forms not typically associated with civil rights law—an emphasis on
process and flexibility, as described below. Yet, equality directives are also
nested within a compliance frame: the carrot and stick of the Spending
Clause. Implementing equality directives requires balancing flexibility and
innovation with incentives to ensure compliance. My aim here is not to
prescribe a particular formula for equality directives: The correct balance
of incentives and flexibility for individual directives should be tailored to
the particular circumstances and developed through an interchange among
government, regulated actors, and private parties. But here I lay out some
key considerations to guide this development going forward. I also address
some potential constitutional concerns with directives.
1.

Balancing Procedural and Substantive Goals

Equality directives emphasize a set of procedural planning
mechanisms (impact assessment, evaluation of alternatives, and
participation) as a means of furthering substantive equity goals. This
emphasis on self-assessment and participation is a key strength of the
approach. Indeed, the procedural “means” is intertwined with the
substantive ends: inclusion. In fact, the harm repeatedly identified by
transportation equity advocates is the failure to include people of color,
people with disabilities, and others in the planning, design, and
implementation of policies and programs.253
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Thomas Sanchez and Marc Brenman begin their definition of transportation equity with the

In addition, integrating equity and inclusionary concerns during frontend planning, before a decision is made, has advantages over the traditional
method of civil rights regulation. In other contexts, commentators have
found that regulatory intervention at the planning stage allows the regulated
actors—who have the most information about the problem—to devise
standards and goals, rather than imposing government standards through
top-down regulation.254 Regimes that allow for innovation and
experimentation can also promote the development of effective solutions in
cases of regulatory uncertainty—that is, when the regulator, regulated
party, and private parties are unclear about the proper solution.255 Beyond
the advantages of expertise and innovation, front-end planning helps
promote stakeholder buy-ins and compliance.256 Similarly, with equality
directives, front-end planning with an equity lens may yield better results
than federal mandates or retrospective evaluation by courts and agencies.
Equality directives can help jurisdictions tailor solutions to local
conditions, creating solutions that may have more legitimacy with
grantees.257
This emphasis on procedural interventions is a strength, yet equality
directives will in some instances benefit from more specific delineation of
the procedural steps that grantees should take. These rules will differ in
particular contexts and must be tailored to the needs of particular areas
(e.g., transportation, housing, agriculture, or criminal justice, among
others). For instance, transportation advocates have sought more specific

concept of ensuring “opportunities for meaningful involvement in the transportation planning
process.” SANCHEZ ET AL., supra note 156, at 8; see also id. at 115 (describing disability groups’
emphasis on inclusion in policy and planning).
254 See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 691, 693–94 (2003)
(conducting case studies in the area of food safety, industrial safety, and environmental protection
to support an account of “management-based regulation”—a regime that directs regulated entities
to engage in a planning process to achieve public goals).
255 See generally Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes:
Institutionalization as a Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110
MICH. L. REV. 1265 (2012) (discussing the emergence of contextualizing regimes: regulatory
regimes that structure engagement by various stakeholders to address public problems
compounded by ignorance or uncertainty).
256 See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 254, at 695–96 (arguing that by allowing stakeholders
to develop solutions, management-based regulation may promote better compliance with
government rules as well as innovative solutions).
257 Cf. Sabel & Simon, supra note 255, at 1308 (describing contextualizing regimes as
beginning with broad norms that evolve and are refined after investigation and deliberation);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1069 (2004) (discussing, in the context of public law
remedies, “rolling-rule regime[s]”—provisional rules that “incorporate a process of reassessment
and revision with continuing stakeholder participation”).

guidance to grantees on the methodology for conducting impact
assessments.258 Similarly, fair housing advocates have asked HUD to revise
its AFFH regulations to require more specific metrics for measuring
progress towards fair housing goals.259
2.

Suggesting and Directing

As discussed above, equality directives must balance the benefits of
flexibility and innovation with methods that ensure compliance by
grantees. This is achieved in part through the penalty aspects of the
enforcement regime, specifically the possibility of fund termination.
Beyond imposing hard constraints and remedies, equality directives might
also promote compliance by providing greater clarity in the requirements
they place on grantees.
As an example, the FTA’s equality directives mandate inclusion, but
only recommend a set of “[e]ffective practices,” making clear that
“[r]ecipients and subrecipients have wide latitude to determine how, when,
and how often specific public involvement measures should take place, and
what specific measures are most appropriate.”260 While the FTA mandates
impact assessments, no guidance specifies the methodology for
determining impacts. Additionally, although “major” changes require
impact assessments, the agency lets grantees define what is “major.”261
HUD’s Fair Housing Planning Guide similarly leaves to grantees the
determination of what constitutes a fair housing barrier, whom to include in
planning, proper data collection methods, and appropriate remedies.262
Some latitude permits innovation, tailoring, and flexibility. Yet
equality directives should delineate specific, effective methodologies for
conducting impact assessments or analyzing barriers to fair housing, and
should provide strong incentives for grantees to adopt such approaches. For
communities seeking to remedy impediments to fair housing, for instance,
equality directives might require jurisdictions to certify that they have

258 See infra note 307 and accompanying text (describing transportation advocates’ requests
for more specific regulatory guidance in the aftermath of a successful administrative complaint).
259 E.g., THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, PUBLIC POLICY BRIEF: REFORMING HUD’S
REGULATIONS TO AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR HOUSING 3 (2010), available at
http://opportunityagenda.org/files/field_file/2010.03ReformingHUDRegulations.pdf.
260 FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at IV-5 (“Recipients should make these determinations
based on the composition of the population affected by the recipient’s action, the type of public
involvement process planned by the recipient, and the resources available to the agency.”).
261 See id. at V-5 (stating that a “major service change[]” is often “defined as a numerical
standard, such as a change that affects 25 percent of service hours of a route”).
262 See FAIR HOUSING PLANNING GUIDE, supra note 2, at 1-5, 2-6 to 2-10, 2-12 to 2-14, 2-23
to 2-24 (providing a framework for an analysis of impediments analysis and the development of a
remedial plan).

eliminated the most common barriers to fair housing or adopted proven
best practices. In general, equality directives should allow tailoring of
solutions by grantees, but they should also strengthen incentives and
guidance to ensure that grantees adopt effective methods for promoting
equality and inclusion.263 The balance between these two goals will need to
be developed in specific contexts, with the input of civil rights
organizations, community groups, the private sector, state and local
governments, and other groups. Consistent with this strategy, civil rights
groups have sought to shape more specific AFFH regulatory guidelines.264
3.

Addressing Constitutional Concerns

It is worth noting that equality directives, in requiring the affirmative
consideration of race and ethnicity, may spark constitutional concerns. A
powerful feature of the regime is that many of these directives condition
federal spending—and thus depend at least in part on Congress’s Spending
Power.265 To date, the Court has construed the Spending Clause to allow
Congress broad power to regulate as long as Congress avoids violating
other constitutional provisions such as the Equal Protection Clause.266

263 Another potential concern is that equality directives subject state and local grantees to too
much federal level regulation. One response to this objection is that equality directives merely
represent implementations of regulatory and statutory disparate impact standards that already
govern grantees. Moreover, the regulatory approach of equality directives—the emphasis on
front-end assessments of impacts and on planning to promote civil rights goals—has advantages
for grantees over subjecting them to complaints after the grantee has completed a project or made
a decision. DOT’s regulations make these advantages explicit: As Sandoval creates the likelihood
of more administrative complaints, equality directives help grantees structure their decisions to
avoid complaints.
264 See Letter from Philip Tegeler, Poverty & Race Research Action Council, et al., to Shaun
Donovan, Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. (Oct. 29, 2010),
available at http://prrac.org/pdf/AFFH_rule_final_pre-publication_comments_10-29-10.pdf
(suggesting components of a strong AFFH rule including accountability and oversight measures).
265 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (giving Congress the “Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States”).
266 Apart from the Fair Housing Act, the directives I have highlighted emerge from statutes
that are the proper exercise of Congress’s Spending Power. This is clear because (1) underlying
programs promote the general welfare in providing transportation, housing, and other services;
(2) the conditions imposed are related to the federal interest in ensuring that all groups fairly
benefit from federal programs and funding; and (3) the conditions are not unduly coercive for
states and localities. See S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207, 211, 217–18 (1987) (discussing
direct limitations on the Spending Power and upholding Congress’s conditioning of federal
highway funds on state adoption of a 21-year-old drinking age); see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (“Title VI invokes Congress’s power under the Spending Clause, U.S.
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, to place conditions on the grant of federal funds.”).
The Supreme Court’s recent decision finding that Congress’s expansion of the federal
Medicaid program—conditioned on states’ loss of federal Medicaid funds—violates the Spending

Some may raise concerns about whether equality directives risk running
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause.267 On this score, the Supreme Court’s
recent decisions point to a tension between the disparate impact standard
and the Equal Protection Clause.268 However, equality directives only
require that racial and ethnic harms be taken into consideration in the
planning and design of program and policy. Given that equality directives
do not require the adoption of an explicitly race-conscious action, they
should not run afoul of current understandings of the Equal Protection
Clause.269

Power is unlikely to alter this analysis for at least four reasons. See National Fed. of Indep. Bus.
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–06 (2012) (finding Congress’s conditioning of Medicaid
expansion on termination of all federal Medicaid funds unduly coercive). First, the Court
reaffirmed the core holding of Dole that the federal government may place conditions on grants to
states. See id. at 2604–05 (explaining and distinguishing Dole). Second, few programs will have
the reach of Medicaid, which accounts for a substantial twenty percent of state budgets. See id. at
2604 (also noting that federal money covers fifty to eighty-three percent of those costs). By
contrast, transportation spending—as important as it is in providing jobs, services, and mobility—
accounts for 7.7% of state budgets, about one third of which comes from federal funds. See
NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 5,
62
(2011),
available
at
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20State%20Expenditure%20Report.pdf.
Accordingly, a court is unlikely to find termination of funds for failure to comply with federal
conditions under these programs unduly coercive. See National Fed. of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at
2604 (finding Medicaid changes to be more than mere inducement for state compliance but
effectively a “gun to the head”). Third, unlike with the Medicaid Expansion, an agency’s ability
to terminate funds under equality directives extends only to the specific program that is
noncompliant, rather than independent programs. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2006) (limiting
fund termination “to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom
such a finding has been made and . . . its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which
such noncompliance has been so found”). Finally, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act addresses
race and ethnic discrimination, so it is also justified under Congress’s power to enforce section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727–
28 (2003) (“Congress may enact so-called prophylactic legislation [under the enforcement clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment] that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent
and deter unconstitutional conduct.”).
267 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Dole, 483 U.S. at 210–11 (holding that exercises of the
Spending Power cannot run afoul of another constitutional provision).
268 The Court’s decision in Ricci v. DeStefano suggests the existence of a tension between the
disparate treatment norm embodied in statutes and the Constitution, as compared with that
embodied in the statutory disparate impact framework. See 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009). The
Court has so far declined to take up Justice Scalia’s invitations to confront this tension directly.
See id. at 2681–82 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The decision] . . . postpones the evil day on which
the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact
provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 consistent with the Constitution’s
guarantee of equal protection?”).
269 Cf. Sheila R. Foster, Environmental Justice & the Constitution, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,347,
10,350 (2009) (arguing prior to Ricci that environmental justice provisions that forbid actions
with an unjustified impact do not contain the type of “‘racial classification’ that federal courts
have been willing to find justifies strict judicial scrutiny of such policies”).

B.

Enhancing Government Implementation

Equality directives depend in large part on the capacity and will for
development of these directives at the federal level, as well as the
implementation of these directives by federal, state, and local actors. In this
section, I explain that the existing system of oversight contains strong
incentives for states and localities to comply. At the same time, I show how
the system might be strengthened. Any suggestions I make here are
necessarily intertwined with private implementation, which I address in the
following section. Strong government oversight and implementation will
certainly depend on prompting by private actors using a range of advocacy
tools.
1.

Oversight Structure

A system of federal agency review backs an equality directive regime,
with possible sanctions for failure to comply. For instance, transportationfunding recipients are required to certify their compliance with Title VI
annually. Every three years, they are required to submit a detailed report to
the Department of Transportation documenting disparate impact
assessments and mitigation efforts taken in response to found impacts, and
providing a record of Title VI complaints and litigation.270 Failure to adhere
to regulatory requirements can lead to a finding that a funding recipient is
“deficient.”271 The Title VI report is then returned to the grantee for
improvement. Grantees are deemed “noncompliant” if they engage in
practices that have the “purpose or effect of denying persons the benefits
of” the grantee’s services, or discriminatorily “exclude” individuals or
groups.272 A finding of noncompliance allows the agency to withhold
federal funds pending resolution of the matter, or to begin a process to
terminate federal funding.273 Similarly, HUD requires an annual
certification from community development grantees that they are
affirmatively furthering fair housing.274
The actual strength of this formal regime depends on agency
willingness to conduct civil rights reviews and to threaten federal funds
termination for failure to do so. In the wake of litigation in Westchester to

270 See FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at II-2 (describing FTA review of recipients and
subrecipients).
271 Id. If the FTA reviews the reporting and finds it satisfactory, the FTA will approve the
reporting as having “no deficiency.” Id. at VIII-2.
272 Id. at VIII-2 to VIII-3; id. at II-3 (defining “non-compliance”).
273 Id.
274 See 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) (2006) (requiring grantees to certify that the grant will be
conducted to “affirmatively further fair housing”).

enforce the fair housing directives,275 for instance, HUD has started to
initiate civil rights reviews of state and local grantees—even apart from
prompting through private complaints or legal action.276 As an example,
HUD recently found that Marin County, California, had failed to meet its
obligation to affirmatively further fair housing. In particular, the County
had received community development funds, but a review by HUD showed
that the County failed to promote fair housing and inclusion, ensure
meaningful citizen participation, and provide adequate accessibility for
persons with disabilities.277 In the end, the County signed a voluntary
agreement with HUD that required it to affirmatively market affordable
housing to minorities and persons with disabilities; to complete an analysis
of impediments to fair housing; and to increase outreach and services to
racial and ethnic minorities, those with limited English speaking
proficiency, and to persons with disabilities.278 HUD also recently
threatened to terminate $10 million in federal funding to a parish in
Louisiana due to the racially and ethnically discriminatory effect of the
parish’s proposed restrictions on multifamily occupancy.279 In response, the
parish rescinded the proposed rules.280 Similarly, HUD withheld $1.7
billion in federal funds from Texas for failing to adhere to AFFH
requirements.281 Because state and local grant recipients are a relatively
small set of repeat players who interact with federal agencies, even a few

275 U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F.
Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see infra notes 288–293 and accompanying text (describing the
Westchester litigation).
276 The National Low Income Housing Coalition, an advocacy group, noted that “legal action
did not precipitate” the Marin County agreement—“another indication that HUD is giving greater
scrutiny and heightened enforcement to affirmatively furthering fair housing.” Memorandum
from National Low Income Housing Coalition to Members 3 (Jan. 14, 2011), available at
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Memo16-2.pdf.
277 See Press Release, Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., HUD and Marin County Agreement
Will Promote Affordable Housing Opportunities for Minorities and Persons with Disabilities
(Jan.
4,
2011),
available
at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press_releases_media_advisories/2011/HUDNo.
11-002 (asserting that “Marin County had failed to meet its [f]air [h]ousing obligations” in its use
of HUD funds).
278 Id.
279 See Craig Gurian & Michael Allen, Making Real the Desegregating Promise of the Fair
Housing Act: “Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing” Comes of Age, 43 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
560, 569 (2010) (noting HUD’s threat to withhold $10 million in federal funds to the parish).
280 See Chris Kirkham, St. Bernard Parish Council Backs Off on Vote on Apartments, THE
TIMES-PICAYUNE
(Nov.
3,
2009,
10:14
PM),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2009/11/st_bernard_parish_council_back.html (reporting
on the parish’s rescission of multifamily occupancy rule in the wake of a federal threat).
281 See Rhiannon Meyers, State Plan for Ike Money Draws 2nd Complaint, GALVESTON
COUNTY DAILY NEWS (Dec. 9, 2009), http://galvestondailynews.com/story/148454/ (detailing the
withholding of federal disaster recovery funding).

such enforcement actions may spur greater compliance by grantees.
2.

Addressing Constraints

Relying on federal agencies and executive power also presents
challenges. The level of civil rights enforcement may vary by presidential
administration. This constraint is potentially significant, but should not be
overstated. For instance, the Bush administration—generally perceived as
less supportive of civil rights—expanded DOT’s equality directives.282 The
Bush Administration also reissued the analysis of impediments guidance
and the Fair Housing Planning Guide, “remind[ing]” jurisdictions of the
need to update their analyses of impediments and of the relevant fair
housing regulations.283 Moreover, once established, equality directives can
be sustained by their own political economy, making wholesale
abandonment of their goals less likely. The structure of equality directives
allows diffusion of goals at the state and local levels, which allows buy-in
by a wide array of willing state and local stakeholders. This diffusion in
turn allows the development of interest group pressure to implement such
goals.284
A related challenge is that federal agencies vary in their capacity to
further inclusionary norms, and some even have regulatory interests that

282 See supra notes 196–205 and accompanying text (detailing the 2007 post-Sandoval
revision of the DOT environmental justice and LEP guidelines).
283 See Memorandum from Nelson R. Bregón, Gen. Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Cmty.
Planning & Dev., and Carolyn Peoples, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Equal Opportunity, U.S.
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to all CPD Field Office Dirs., et al. (Sept. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/library/finaljointletter.pdf. The Bush Administration again
reminded community development grantees of their fair housing duties in 2007. See
Memorandum from Pamela H. Patenaude, Assistant Sec’y for Cmty. Planning & Dev., and Kim
Kendrick, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. & Opportunity, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., to
Cmty. Planning & Dev. Field Dirs., et al. (Feb. 9, 2007), available at
http://www.hud.gov/offices/fheo/promotingfh/fairhousing-cdbg.pdf.
284 Of course, whether this happens with equality directives remains to be seen. But the
development and diffusion of other civil rights norms and policies shows that a complex political
economy can develop to sustain even controversial programs. For instance, John Skrentny has
shown how pragmatic bureaucrats in federal agencies and political leaders like Richard Nixon
came to promote affirmative action in employment. See JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 221–25 (1996) (summarizing his account of the complex culture and
politics that helped lead to the development and endurance of affirmative action despite its
tension with moral and political goals of colorblindness). I do not invoke this analogy to suggest
that equality directives should follow along the same fraught path as affirmative action, but only
to emphasize that policies help create politics, and politics in turn sustain policies. Cf. Mara S.
Sidney, National Fair Housing Policy and Its (Perverse) Effects on Local Advocacy, in FRAGILE
RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 84, at 208–09 (arguing that policies mobilize groups by
allocating resources to them and by instantiating the definition of a social problem). As I discuss
later, I believe that the political alliances that will help sustain equality directives are worth
developing. See infra notes 309–315 and accompanying text.

run counter to civil rights and equity concerns.285 Importantly, this
challenge stems from what I have previously identified as a strength of the
equality directives approach.286 Equality directives’ power lies in their
“embeddedness” in federal agencies that distribute funding, oversee
programs, and have rulemaking authority—agencies like the DOT and
HUD—rather than agencies that are dedicated to addressing civil rights,
like the EEOC.
Yet this embedded strength can prove a constraint when civil rights
goals are not a federal agency’s priority. Addressing this constraint requires
supporting the civil rights capacity of the agencies by, for instance,
expanding staff and other resources to conduct oversight and provide
technical assistance. Particular equality directives might require revision to
incorporate increased oversight and reporting. For instance, the
Government Accounting Office (GAO) recently recommended a set of
changes to improve the efficacy of the analysis of impediments process. In
its recommendations, the GAO advised that HUD should not only increase
oversight, but also promulgate regulations requiring periodic updating of
the analysis of impediments and submission for reviews of the same by
HUD.287
In short, increasing support and funding for government oversight and
implementation is crucial. This is true not simply at the federal level, but at
all levels of government. The question is how to create incentives to more
fully implement the regime. The best answer, I believe, lies in private
group advocacy. Private groups must engage these directives—by
explaining their benefits in particular substantive areas, pushing for
expansion where appropriate, and advocating for greater funding,
implementation, and oversight at all levels of government. As I show in the
next section, I see promising efforts emerging upon which civil society
groups might expand.
C.

Expanding Private Group Engagement

Agency-driven oversight is only one way of ensuring that these
directives are brought to life. Depending on agency enforcement presents

285 See, e.g., BONASTIA, supra note 110, at 13–14, 139 (arguing that HUD has historically
proved a weak “institutional home” for civil rights enforcement); SANCHEZ ET AL., supra note
156, at 76–77 (noting the limitations of DOT in enforcing civil rights).
286 See text accompanying notes 139–141 (describing the virtues of integrating civil rights
requirements into the ongoing requirements and operations of a funding program).
287 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-905, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
GRANTS: HUD NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT OF JURISDICTIONS’
FAIR
HOUSING
PLANS
32–33
(Sept.
2010),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/311065.pdf.

the risk of paper compliance—merely ensuring that grantees have
completed paperwork certifying their compliance with Title VI or AFFH
directives. Moreover, lacking resources or will, agencies might fail to take
further steps to evaluate whether grantees have met substantive goals. In
addition, relying on administrative review is likely to generate little
enthusiasm from civil society groups traditionally interested in rights
enforcement. Even with the benefits I have articulated, such a system
compares poorly to courts if it operates without the support of private civil
society groups. From this vantage point, an administrative enforcement
regime that leaves little room for private engagement will seem thin.
For these reasons, I see private group engagement as a vital part of the
equality directive regime. Building on existing efforts to enforce and
implement these directives can occur through traditional forms of private
attorney general-type enforcement, as I describe below. But private
implementation of equality directives should not be limited to traditional
forms of enforcement. Equality directives’ success depends on civil rights
groups using a variety of advocacy tools to further implementation. Success
also depends on civil rights groups engaging with community-based
groups, particularly at the state and local levels.
1.

Harnessing the Private Attorney General

Where possible, private advocates should use traditional litigation
tools and administrative enforcement to encourage states and localities to
comply with equality directives, to create incentives for broader
compliance, and to strengthen the scope of equality directives. Promising
efforts are already emerging.
a.

Litigation

A New York–based fair housing group recently brought suit to
enforce the fair housing equality directives in Westchester County, New
York. As previously noted, Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting implied
private rights of action inhibits litigation to enforce equality directives.288 In
the Westchester case, the plaintiffs effectively surmounted this doctrinal

288 See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275
(2001), and Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002), raise formidable challenges to private
enforcement of provisions in Title VI and Title VIII that lack explicit private rights of action. The
Sandoval Court appeared to leave open the possibility of private enforcement through 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2006). See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299–300 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Title
VI’s disparate impact regulation could be enforced using § 1983). However, some lower courts
have not allowed the use of § 1983 to enforce Title VIII’s AFFH provision. See, e.g., Asylum Hill
Problem Solving Revitalization Ass’n v. King, 36 Conn. L. Rptr. 422 (Super. Ct. 2004) (declining
to enforce Title VIII’s AFFH provisions using § 1983).

challenge by relying on a novel argument. They argued that Westchester’s
annual certifications to the federal government, which stated that it had
complied with the equality directives, were “false” within the meaning of
the False Claims Act.289 The district court substantially accepted the
plaintiffs’ arguments and granted them partial summary judgment. The
judgment held that the County failed to conduct a proper analysis of
impediments or take action to address racial discrimination and segregation
within the County.290 With the help of HUD, the parties negotiated a
consent decree that remains subject to monitoring by the district court.
It may be too early to deem the case a complete success. Positively,
the consent decree requires Westchester to pay $30 million to the federal
government, $21.6 million of which would be placed in a HUD account
specifically for the purpose of developing integrated housing in the
County.291 The settlement also requires the County to spend $30 million to
build affordable housing in communities with low minority populations.292
At the same time, as of this writing, the plaintiffs’ counsel contend that the
County and the court-appointed monitor have taken insufficient action to
comply with the decree.293
However, in significant ways the case has already strengthened the
fair housing equality directive regime. For example, in holding Westchester

289 U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F.
Supp. 2d 548, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (adjudicating plaintiffs’ claim under the False Claims Act).
The False Claims Act includes a qui tam provision that allows third parties to bring suits against
alleged defrauders of the federal government. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2006). The
Antidiscrimination Center of New York (ADC) claimed that Westchester took $52 million in
federal grants for housing development between 2000 and 2006 while falsely certifying that it
was complying with the FHA regulations to affirmatively further fair housing. See Complaint-inIntervention of the United States at 13, 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (No. 06 Civ. 2860 (DLC)). In
previous work, I have written more extensively about the facts and legal theories in the case. See
Johnson, supra note 56, at 1215–18 (summarizing the Westchester litigation).
290 See Westchester, 668 F. Supp. 2d at 564–65 (concluding that the County “utterly failed to
comply with the regulatory requirement that the County perform and maintain a record of its
analysis of the impediments to fair housing choice in terms of race”).
291 See Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal ¶ 3, U.S. ex rel. Anti-Discrimination
Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc., v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06 Civ.
2860 (DLC)).
292 Id. ¶ 5.
293 See Doesn’t the Westchester Consent Decree Require an Implementation Plan That Insures
Pro-AFFH
Development?,
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
CTR.
(Jul.
21,
2012),
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-false-claims-case/doesnt-westchester-consent-decreerequire-implementation-plan-insures- (decrying the lack of an adequate implementation plan to
promote integrated housing in the County); Monitor’s “2-year” Review Fails to Hold
Westchester
to
Account,
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
CTR.
(Jan.
10,
2012),
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-false-claims-case/monitor’s-“2year-review”-fails-holdwestchester-account (contending that Westchester County is violating the implementation consent
decree and that the court-appointed monitor is failing to take appropriate action).

County liable, the opinion makes clear that states and localities need to do
more than paper compliance with equality directives; they must do a
meaningful analysis of impediments to fair housing and take remedial
action. This ruling will thus likely affect jurisdictions beyond Westchester
County. More than one thousand state and local grantees under the
community development block grant program must certify that they are
furthering fair housing,294 must implement a more robust meaning of that
certification, and may face consequences—adverse litigation and
administrative action—for failing to further those goals.295 A stable set of
repeat players means that actors should have institutional incentives to
further the equality directive’s goals. Grantees regularly receive state and
local federal funding (in this case through the Community Development
and Block Grant Program), interact with federal administrators about the
funding proposals,296 and engage in learning networks with each other.297
Relatedly, in its actions surrounding the case, the federal government

294 See Community Development Block Grant Program—CDBG, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN
DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelop
ment/programs (last visited July 4, 2012) (summarizing the CDBG program).
295 Most CDBG grantees are known as “entitlement jurisdictions.” These jurisdictions are
generally urban counties and metropolitan areas that receive annual grants on a formula basis. See
Community Development Block Grant Entitlement Communities Grants, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URBAN
DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelop
ment/programs/entitlement (last visited July 4, 2012).
296 To receive its annual CDBG entitlement grant, a grantee must prepare and submit a
Consolidated Plan to HUD. See 24 C.F.R. § 91 (2006) (specifying the scope and requirements of
a Consolidated Plan). A Consolidated Plan is a jurisdiction’s comprehensive planning document
and application for funding under certain Community Planning and Development formula grant
programs. Community Development Block Grant Entitlement Communities Grants, supra note
295. HUD provides on-going technical assistance and training for grantees. See, e.g., “Basically
CDBG” Course Training Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelop
ment/training/basicallycdbg (last visited July 4, 2012) (providing training on requirements for
CDBG grantees).
297 Learning networks occur through nonprofit umbrella associations comprised of local
governments. The associations provide technical assistance and serve as a clearinghouse for
information about CDBG and other HUD programs. See, e.g., National Community Development
Association—About NCDA, NAT’L CMTY. DEV. ASS’N, http://www.ncdaonline.org/overview.asp
(last visited July 4, 2012) (describing the association as comprised of 550 local governments and
designed to provide information on federally funded community and economic development
programs). HUD’s trainings also provide opportunities to share information, as do nonprofit
foundations and the general dissemination of research and best practices. See, e.g., Publications—
Community and Economic Development, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
http://www.huduser.org/portal/taxonomy/term/34 (last visited July 4, 2012); Training, U.S.
DEP’T
OF
HOUS.
&
URBAN
DEV.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/comm_planning/communitydevelop
ment/training (last visited July 4, 2012).

conveyed that it would take enforcement of the regulatory directives more
seriously. HUD not only helped broker the settlement, but also vowed to
strengthen the fair housing regulations and to enforce them more
vigorously.298
Finally, the case mobilized private actors. For instance, it prompted
advocacy from fair housing groups that previously focused mainly on
private litigation in individual cases.299 One effect of the case was to reveal
to fair housing groups the potential gains of increased attention to these
equality directives. National, state, and local housing groups have banded
together to press for a broader revision of the AFFH rules. They advocate
for a more specific set of goals and requirements on housing and urban
development grant recipients.300
b.

Administrative Enforcement

Private groups can also participate in enforcement of the equality
directives through administrative complaint mechanisms at both federal
and state levels. The success of administrative complaints depends in
substantial part on agency willingness to process them and take them
seriously. Private groups need to engage in advocacy to ensure such
enforcement occurs. A recent complaint against a local transit agency
provides a powerful example of the potential of such complaints to prompt
compliance by grantees.
In 2009, several San Francisco Bay Area groups filed a Title VI
complaint against the Bay Area Regional Transit Authority (BART), which
operates the public rail system that connects San Francisco, California with
the surrounding East Bay and Northern San Mateo counties. BART sought
to extend the transit system using regional revenue, $70 million in stimulus

298 A HUD official was quoted in the New York Times as saying, “Until now, we tended to lay
dormant. This is historic, because we are going to hold people’s feet to the fire.” Sam Roberts,
Housing Accord in Westchester, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A1; see also Allen, supra note
250, at 16 (describing the Westchester litigation as a “groundbreaking lawsuit” which contributes
to stronger civil rights enforcement in housing); Johnson, supra note 56, at 1223–24 (describing
HUD efforts to revise the AFFH regulations and to enforce existing requirements in state and
local programs).
299 See Johnson, supra note 56, at 1223–24 (providing an account of private group
mobilization as a result of the Westchester case).
300 See Housing Fairness Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 476 Before the Subcomm. on Hous.
and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 5–6 (2010) (statement of
John D. Trasviña, Assistant Sec’y for Fair Hous. and Equal Opportunity) (describing efforts to
reform the AFFH rule); Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing and Fair Housing Plans, Notice of
Informal Meeting, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,456 (July 13, 2009) (announcing informal meeting to collect
public views on proposed rules to implement AFFH); Gurian & Allen, supra note 279 (noting
that the Westchester case helped to spur current rulemaking).

funds,301 and loans from the DOT.302 The groups argued that the system
extension would not adequately service public transit–dependent lowincome and minority populations of East Oakland and that it would ignore
the environmental impacts on communities of color.303 In their complaint to
the Federal Transit Agency, the groups alleged that BART failed to prepare
the required service and fare equity analyses as required by DOT’s equality
directive304 or to conduct a proper analysis of disparate impact.305 Agreeing
that BART’s impact analyses were insufficient, the DOT reallocated $70
million from the airport connection project to other BART projects.306

301 The region’s Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) oversees funding for the
BART system. The extension project cost $459 million overall. Abstract: Resolution No. 3434,
Revised,
METRO.
TRANSP.
COMM’N
(Dec.
19,
2001),
available
at
http://mtc.ca.gov/planning/rtep/pdf/RES-3434.pdf. In 2009, the MTC allegedly agreed to allocate
$70 million in stimulus money to help fund the project. See Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and Executive Order 12,898, Urban Habitat Program v. Bay Area Rapid
Transit Dist., at 21–22 (Sept. 1, 2009) [hereinafter BART Complaint], available at
http://www.publicadvocates.org/sites/default/files/library/fta_titlevi_complaint_09109final.pdf.
302 This loan was anticipated to be up to $150 million through the Transportation
Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act. In addition to receiving funding for this specific
project, BART received federal financial assistance through Section 5307 of the Urbanized Area
Formula grants program. See BART Complaint, supra note 301, at 16.
303 The groups were: Urban Habitat, an Oakland-based nonprofit environmental justice
organization; TransForm, an Oakland-based group that seeks to strengthen public transportation
infrastructure in the Bay Area; and Genesis, a regional faith-based organization whose members
and constituents include low-income people and people of color. The public interest firm Public
Advocates represented them. See id. at 1.
304 See FTA C 4702.1A, supra note 1, at V-5.
305 The complaint contended that BART failed to follow the equality directives in three ways.
Namely, BART failed (1) to base its analysis on current demographic data; (2) to conduct a
comparative analysis of the impact of alternative proposals on service, affordability, speed, and
cost-efficiency; and (3) to analyze the effect of replacing existing transit service and removing
certain existing transit stops. See BART Complaint, supra note 301, at 22. The plaintiffs also
alleged that BART had failed to take steps to mitigate impacts or consider less discriminatory
alternatives. See id. at 22–23.
306 Initially, the FTA administrator contacted relevant BART and MTC officials expressing
serious concerns regarding the failure to conduct an equity analysis and threatening the
withdrawal of federal stimulus funds. See Letter from Peter M. Rogoff, U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
Fed. Transit Admin., to Steve Heminger, Executive Dir., Metro. Transp. Comm’n, & Dorothy
Dugger, Gen. Manager, S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. (Jan. 15, 2010), available at
http://www.bart.gov/docs/BART_MTC_Letter_On_OAC.pdf. BART responded by submitting a
document purporting to conduct a Title VI analysis of the project’s impact on environmental
justice, on racial and ethnic minorities, and on LEP persons. See Letter from Peter Rogoff, U.S.
Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Transit Admin., to Steve Heminger, Executive Dir., Metro. Transp.
Comm’n, & Dorothy Dugger, Gen. Manager, S.F. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. 1 (Feb. 12,
2010),
available
at
http://www.urbanhabitat.org/files/Feb%2012%20BART%20MTC%20Letter_0.pdf
(indicating
that BART had submitted a corrective action plan in response to FTA’s January 15, 2010 letter).
The FTA, however, found that BART had failed to provide a coherent policy for evaluating
changes in system services, conduct a proper analysis of impacts of major service changes, assess
alternative methods of transportation, or properly include affected minority and low-income

The BART case illustrates the power of the administrative complaint
process as a means of enforcing equality directives. Much like the
Westchester example, this case renders a seemingly procedural requirement
into a tool for meaningful change. Namely, it requires a meaningful impact
assessment that incorporates appropriate data and effective methodology
and that adequately considers alternatives. Moreover, in withholding funds
from the project, the agency showed its willingness to impose sanctions for
failing to comply with the equality directive. The significance of the
enforcement action will likely extend well beyond BART, prompting more
robust compliance by transit agencies with the equality directives and
pursuit of the goals that they represent.
Civil society groups, too, have leveraged the BART case in important
ways. For instance, they have used it to promote improvements in DOT’s
impact assessment process and to argue that DOT should revise the
guidance it gives to grantees.307 The FTA has so far declined to revise its
rules. However, the FTA did issue a written notice to all funding recipients,
affirming the need to follow the Circular’s specific directive to assess the
impacts of service and fare changes.308
2.

Becoming the Private Implementer

Litigation and administrative action are thus important forms of
intervention to enforce and implement equality directives. They should not,
however, be the only tools used to implement equality directives. In part,
this is justified by the practical reasons I have previously mentioned—the
constraints of private and administrative enforcement mechanisms.309 Even
apart from these constraints, equality directives present an opportunity to
use a broader range of advocacy tools. Equality directives thus provide a

communities. See id. (rejecting BART’s plan as inadequate for compliance before FTA’s March
5, 2010 deadline).
307 See generally PUBLIC ADVOCATES & URBAN HABITAT, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION: PROPOSED FTA ACTIONS TO BUILD ON
ITS
STRONG
RECORD
OF
ENFORCEMENT
(2010),
available
at
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/White_Paper_on_FTA_Title_VI_Circular_with_cover_letter_12-2010.pdf (outlining transportation equity groups’ recommendations to the FTA regarding
strengthening Title VI enforcement). Transit equity and other public interest groups have
recommended that DOT adopt specific guidance to grantees on how to analyze whether an action
has an impact on a protected population. Id. at 7.
308 Letter from Peter Rogoff, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Transit Admin., to Colleagues (Mar.
8,
2011),
available
at
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/Dear_Colleague_Letter__Civil_Rights_-_March_2011.pdf.
309 See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence
having the effect of limiting private enforcement); supra notes 100–103 and accompanying text
(detailing the limits of administrative enforcement).

mechanism for broadening the practice of civil rights law—extending it
beyond adjudicative enforcement and connecting civil rights groups to the
work of community-based groups. I show below an emerging practice to
enforce equality directives lying at the intersection of civil rights law—
with its traditional focus on court-enforced rights—and community-based
policy advocacy. As I explain, civil society groups are already undertaking
efforts to implement existing equality directives, to expand their meaning
and efficacy, and to oversee state and federal implementation of their
objectives.
One component of this work is sharing model interventions with state
and local governments and other advocacy groups. For instance, groups
have begun to publish reports showing whether states and localities
effectively promote fair housing in federally funded programs and to gather
concrete examples of innovative interventions.310 Similarly, transportation
advocates and researchers publicize model impact assessments and
effective interventions in transportation equity, such as efforts to include
minority groups in public participation and planning.311 Stakeholders can
use these efforts as a roadmap to creatively use federal fair housing funds.
Advocates can use information about best practices to pressure less
enthusiastic states and localities.
Another aspect of this work involves urging federal-level actors to
monitor and enforce equality directives. Advocates are encouraging federal
government actors to issue more specific equality rules, strengthen
oversight of state and local grantees, and sanction noncompliant states and

310 See, e.g., SARAH BOOKBINDER ET AL., POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL &
LAWYERS’ COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, BUILDING OPPORTUNITY: CIVIL RIGHTS BEST PRACTICES
IN THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM (2008), available at
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/BuildingOpportunity.pdf; Opportunity Communities, KIRWAN INST.,
http://www.kirwaninstitute.org/research/opportunity-communities/page/4/ (last visited July 4,
2012) (describing work in Wisconsin to link affordable housing siting to job-rich opportunity
networks); Twin Cities Low Income Housing, INST. ON RACE & POVERTY, UNIV. OF MINN.,
http://www.irpumn.org/website/projects/index.php?strWebAction=project_detail&intProjectID=2
8 (last visited July 4, 2012) (showing siting and levels of segregation in federally funded lowincome housing programs). Notably, many of these groups consider themselves to be civil rights
organizations, but do not engage in traditional litigation.
311 See, e.g., THOMAS W. SANCHEZ ET AL., CTR. FOR COMM. CHANGE & THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, MOVING TO EQUITY: ADDRESSING INEQUITABLE EFFECTS OF TRANSPORTATION
POLICY
ON
MINORITIES
32–34
(2003),
available
at
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/metro-and-regional-inequalities/transportation/movingto-equity-addressing-inequitable-effects-of-transportation-policies-on-minorities/sanchezmoving-to-equity-transportation-policies.pdf (describing participation by minority groups in
transportation planning and LEP-related improvements and delineating challenges in ensuring
robust participation); id. at 38–40 (recommending mechanisms for improving the inclusion of
minority and low-income groups).

localities.312 This will entail the familiar work of federal level advocacy—
publishing letters and issuing reports, meeting with agency and
congressional officials, and generating public awareness. Relatedly, civil
society groups can show how state and local governments are falling short
of the requirements and goals of the equality directives. In the area of
transportation, these groups highlight the lack of public participation and
the failure to include minorities and women in transportation planning.313
They also advocate for improvements in federally subsidized public
transit.314 In housing, they evaluate whether states and localities have
completed analyses of impediments and comprehensively analyzed barriers
to fair housing. Advocates also continue to monitor whether governments
are taking steps to overcome their identified impediments.315
Equality directives are relatively new, and so too is this advocacy.
Thus, its ultimate success remains to be seen. Yet advocates on the ground
are beginning to incorporate these directives into their broader advocacy
strategies. In this vein, national organizations have begun to instruct their
state and local partners on how to make use of equality directives. In the
area of fair housing, for instance, the National Low Income Housing
Coalition (NLIHC)—a group of low-income housing advocates and
providers—guides its members on enforcement of the analysis of
impediments required in their jurisdictions. In its guide to low-income
housing advocacy, the group explains the regulatory requirements and the
process for devising analyses of impediments. The NLIHC guide also
provides examples showing advocates how to use HUD’s Fair Housing

312 See, e.g., THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 259, at 11–18 (providing
recommendations for strengthening implementation of the AFFH equality directive); Letter from
Philip Tegeler, Poverty & Race Research Action Council, et al., to John Trasviña, Assistant
Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., and HUD staff (July 29, 2009), available at
http://www.prrac.org/pdf/AffirmativelyFurtheringFairHousing7-29-09comments.pdf (providing
comments on proposed AFFH regulation).
313 See, e.g., Thomas W. Sanchez, An Equity Analysis of Transportation Funding, RACE,
POVERTY & ENV’T, Fall 2008, at 72, available at http://urbanhabitat.org/node/2812 (providing
data showing underrepresentation of women and minorities on transportation planning boards and
advocating for increased representation).
314 For example, the Minnesota Urban League and the University of Minnesota’s Institute of
Race and Poverty document the effect of transit cuts on communities of color and successfully
advocate for restoration of crucial services. See Transit Equity on the Northside, INST. ON RACE
&
POVERTY,
UNIV.
OF
MINN.,
http://www.irpumn.org/website/projects/index.php?strWebAction=project_detail&intProjectID=2
1 (last visited July 4, 2012).
315 For examples of such work, see Building Inclusive Communities, INCLUSIVE
COMMUNITIES PROJECT, http://www.inclusivecommunities.net/build.php (last visited July 4,
2012)
and
Affordable
Housing,
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
CTR.,
http://www.antibiaslaw.com/affordable-housing (last visited July 4, 2012).

Planning Guide in their work,316 including participating in the development
of analyses of impediments, monitoring compliance on actions to address
impediments, and seeking remedies from HUD.317 Similarly, the
Transportation Equity Network—a coalition of state and locally based nongovernmental organizations—instructs its members on the regulatory
requirements and provides examples of effective litigation, administrative
advocacy, and organizing strategies.318
This emerging advocacy builds on instances of “hard” enforcement of
equality directives by administrative agencies and courts. The NLIHC
encourages state and local groups to take the Westchester case to their
jurisdictions and reminds them of the court’s holding that the “AFFH
certification was not a mere boilerplate formality, but rather was a
substantive requirement . . . .”319 Similarly, transportation advocates
highlight the successes of litigation and administrative complaints such as
the BART case.320 This new advocacy involves providing technical
assistance, shaming noncompliant states and localities, prodding and
advocacy, and participating in the impact assessments and other tools of
equality directives. One might call this work private implementation of
equality directives. The private implementer builds on the gains of the
private attorney general, but is not constrained by adjudicative advocacy.
The work to implement equality directives has the potential to engage
a broader set of groups than traditional adjudicative civil rights

316 See NATIONAL LOW INCOME HOUSING COALITION (NLIHC), 2011 Advocates’ Guide to
Housing
and
Community
Development Policy
16–20
(2011), available
at
http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/2011-Advocates-Guide.pdf (explaining how advocates can
monitor compliance with analysis of impediments requirements and providing examples of
successful administrative and legal complaints against jurisdictions that failed to appropriately
further fair housing).
317 See id. at 17–18 (suggesting that advocates invoke the public participation requirements of
the Consolidated Plan to participate in analysis of impediments development and listing the
requirements of analyses of impediments and steps advocates should take when jurisdictions fail
to comply).
318 See Marc Brenman, Webinar Powerpoint Presentation, Unlocking Title VI: Understanding
Your
Rights,
TRANSPORTATION
EQUITY
NETWORK,
http://www.transportationequity.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=285:civilrights-act-webinar-tools-for-equity&catid=63:feature (follow “Presentation by Marc Brenman”
hyperlink) (last visited July 4, 2012).
319 HUD Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Westchester County, N.Y., NAT’L LOW
INCOME
HOUS.
COAL.
(June
5,
2009),
http://www2398.ssldomain.com/nlihc/detail/article.cfm?article_id=6182 (quoting U.S. ex rel.
Anti-Discrimination Center v. Westchester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
320 See, e.g., Guillermo Mayer, Senior Staff Att’y, Public Advocates Inc., The Oakland Airport
Connector: A Case Study on Title VI Administrative Enforcement, TRANSPORTATION EQUITY,
http://www.transportationequity.org/images/downloads/TEN_Title_VI_Webinar_20100708_G.M
ayer.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2012) (describing Public Advocates Inc.’s efforts in the Oakland
Airport Connector case).

enforcement. As the housing and transportation examples show, this
advocacy connects groups that have traditionally focused on rights
enforcement with those who engage in non-litigation advocacy and
community organizing. These efforts also bring “rights” groups—who
operate in an antidiscrimination frame—together with groups concerned
with poverty alleviation, community revitalization, and environmental
reform. In that vein, private implementation efforts of equality directives
respond to the critique that civil rights lawyering is too centered on formal
rights that benefit the middle class and insufficiently focused on the
structural problems of poverty and exclusion.321
One must acknowledge that even with strong advocacy and oversight
efforts, some states and localities may not adopt or implement a robust
regime of equality directives. Grantees might undertake only half-hearted
efforts, even in the face of federal oversight or advocacy by private actors.
This will be true in any regime that depends in large part on willing
government partners.322 Evidence from the structural reform literature
shows that these constraints exist even in regimes that depend primarily on
judicial enforcement: They, too, require government cooperation for
implementation of court-ordered remedies.323 Equality directives provide a

321 See, e.g., Banks & Ford, supra note 18, at 1120 (arguing that “the goal of eliminating
discrimination is too modest, not ambitious enough” given the state of structural inequity). For
instance, in the area of transportation, two groups in Northern California—Policy Link and Public
Advocates (a civil rights law firm)—have sought not only to monitor transportation equity issues
in their state and at the federal level, but also to more broadly increase the capacity of state and
local groups to perform such monitoring. See, e.g., POLICY LINK, MAKING EQUITY CENTRAL TO
FEDERAL
TRANSPORTATION
POLICY
6
(2009),
available
at
http://www.policylink.org/atf/cf/%7B97C6D565-BB43-406D-A6D5ECA3BBF35AF0%7D/Transportation-Equity-Executive-Summary.pdf (announcing the goal of
building the capacity of local, state, and regional transportation equity leaders). The Los Angeles–
based Transportation Equity Network has spearheaded advocacy in Southern California. See, e.g.,
Letter from Barbara J. Schultz et al., L.A. Transp. Network to L.A. Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth.
(Apr. 11, 2001) (on file with the New York University Law Review) (arguing that the Los Angeles
transportation plan failed to properly conduct a Title VI analysis or to properly include required
groups).
322 See Johnson, supra note 117, at 422 (describing enforcement challenges in juvenile justice
and No Child Left Behind which depend on the “political landscape in particular states, the
existence of internal reform agents, [and] the skill of the nongovernmental organizations in
applying political pressure”).
323 For instance, Gerald Rosenberg authored an important work calling into doubt the capacity
of courts to produce significant social reform. He argues that courts will be successful only under
particular conditions, including where there is support for reform by the executive, legislative,
and administrative branches of government. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE:
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 35–36 (1991) (listing, among other conditions:
“support for change from substantial numbers in Congress and from the executive” and
“[a]dministrators and officials crucial for implementation [who] are willing to act and see court
orders as a tool for leveraging additional resources or for hiding behind”).

new infrastructure for civil rights, one that now seeks to promote structural
equality and inclusion. And equality directives provide a platform from
which to leverage existing litigation efforts and connect civil rights lawyers
with community groups already engaging in advocacy and community
mobilization. If the success of civil rights and inclusionary goals depends
not just on courts but on broader forms of political and social
mobilization,324 then equality directives both depend on and enhance these
forms of mobilization.
CONCLUSION

This Article highlights equality directives, a form of regulation
excluded from standard narratives of public and private enforcement in
civil rights. Proactive requirements that state actors promote equality and
inclusion have long been embedded in key civil rights statutes. However, a
more robust regulatory regime has emerged in recent years. In some cases,
it emerged out of the ashes of Sandoval’s weakening of the private attorney
general function.
Many of these equality directives are new. Future academic studies
might examine: (1) how these directives continue to be internalized at the
federal level in the “permanent government”325 of agencies; (2) how they
are implemented at the state and local levels; and (3) their potential utility
in areas outside of transportation and housing, such as criminal justice or
public health. Subsequent examinations should also consider the
relationship between equality directives and a broader trend of requiring
racial impact assessments of government policies: Several states have
recently adopted legislation requiring that state legislatures and agencies
evaluate the racial impact of pending legislation and regulations and

324 The academic literature provides support for this view about the likely components of
effective social reform. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY
REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 294–96 (1994) (studying the gender pay
equity movement and concluding that litigation used in conjunction with other advocacy tactics
can be an effective tool for social change); ROSENBERG, supra note 323, at 342–43 (arguing that
significant social reform requires “mobilization and participation” by social groups in addition to
litigation). At the same time, one must acknowledge that social science is unable to prove the
relative efficacy of various reform strategies. See generally John Goering, The Effectiveness of
Fair Housing Programs and Policy Options, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES, supra note 84,
at 254 (explaining, in the context of fair housing, the difficulty of disentangling the relative
contributions of law, public policy, and non-policy-driven social reforms in producing social and
behavioral change); Michael W. McCann, Reform Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
715, 727–28 (1991) (reviewing Gerald Rosenberg’s The Hollow Hope and arguing that
Rosenberg’s account of the inefficacy of courts ignores evidence that judicial rulings resulted in
advancements in particular areas related to civil rights; arguing further that Rosenberg fails to
evaluate the constraints of courts relative to other bureaucratic institutions).
325 GRAHAM, supra note 55, at 7.

consider race-neutral alternatives.326
American equality directives also raise questions for future
exploration by scholars of comparative antidiscrimination law and of
American political development. For example, one might examine how the
development and implementation of American equality directives compares
to those in Europe and the United Kingdom. This line of inquiry might be
particularly interesting given the fragmentation of the American
governance structure, the relative electoral and interest group power of
minority groups in America, and America’s long-standing emphasis on
rights.
For civil rights advocates and commentators interested in promoting
social equity and inclusion, this Article aims to direct attention to the
potential that lies in equality directives. An emphasis on individualized
harm, antidiscrimination, and the private sphere is inadequate to the task of
promoting equality and inclusion today. Equality directives supplement the
antidiscrimination frame because they are attuned to the structural
dimensions of inequality. They extend beyond bias to address the state’s
contribution to contemporary inequality, as well as the state’s capacity to
promote inclusion. To fully unleash the capacity of equality directives
requires building on promising initiatives that are beginning to alter the
nature of contemporary civil rights advocacy. These initiatives are moving
beyond the conception of the civil rights advocate as a private attorney
general and using a range of advocacy tools to expand, implement, and
leverage these directives at the federal, state, and local levels.

326 See H.B. 5933, § 5, 2008 Conn. Acts No. 08-143 (Reg. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN.
§
2-24b
(2012)
(effective
June
5,
2008)),
available
at
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/ACT/PA/2008PA-00143-R00HB-05933-PA.htm (requiring a racial
impact assessment of proposed legislation affecting criminal justice and sentencing); H.F. 2393, §
3, 82d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2008) (codified as amended at IOWA CODE § 8.11 (2012)),
available
at
http://coolice.legis.iowa.gov/CoolICE/default.asp?Category=billinfo&Service=Billbook&menu=false&ga=82&hbill=HF2393
(requiring minority impact statements for state grant applications and changes to state criminal or
sentencing law or procedures).

